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In this paper we build a model of market competition among religious denominations, using a framework
that involves incomplete contracts and the production of club goods.  We treat denominations akin
to multinational enterprises, which decide which countries to enter based on local market conditions
and their own “productivity.”  The model yields predictions for how a denomination’s religious doctrine
and governance structure affect its ability to attract adherents.  We test these predictions using data
on the foreign operations of US Protestant denominations in 2005 from the World Christian Database.
Consistent with the model, we find that (1) denominations with stricter religious doctrine attract more
adherents in countries in which the risk of natural disaster or disease outbreak  is greater and in which
government provision of health services is weaker, and (2) denominations with a decentralized governance
structure attract more adherents in countries in which the productivity of pastor effort is higher.  These
findings shed light on factors determining the composition of religion within countries, helping account
for the rise of new Protestant denominations in recent decades.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rivalry between religious groups is a constant feature of human society.  Historically, 
competition was often resolved by military conflict (Iyigun, 2008), with victors imposing their 
religion on the vanquished.  Today, it is common for religious groups to compete for adherents 
through the market.  Over the last 50 years, options for religious practice have expanded 
globally, as the end of colonialism, the demise of communist regimes, and the spread of 
democracy have weakened the control of state-sponsored churches and reduced the prevalence of 
governments based on anti-clericalism (Michelthwait and Wooldridge, 2009).
1  Religious 
groups, be they Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, are increasingly international in outlook, with the 
goal to build global bodies of believers, rather than simply national ones (Thomas, 2010).   
In this paper, we build a model of market competition among religious groups and apply 
it to the foreign operations of Protestant denominations headquartered in the US. We treat a 
denomination akin to a multinational enterprise, which chooses which markets to enter, based on 
the combined objectives of attracting members and generating revenues.
2  A denomination enters 
a market by choosing to recognize local congregations as members of its global organization, 
which is analogous to international licensing or franchising.  In our theoretical model, three 
attributes of a denomination affect its membership.  One is its attractiveness to believers, which 
we treat as a characteristic similar to firm productivity (Melitz, 2003).  A second is its religious 
doctrine.  We apply Iannaccone’s (1994) insight that stricter religious groups are more efficient 
in organizing the production of quasi-public goods, which attract believers.  A third attribute is 
organizational structure.  Some denominations are centralized, placing authority over pastors and 
doctrine in the hands of international bodies, whereas others are decentralized, giving individual 
congregations control (Chaves, 1993a).  We use a model with incomplete contracts (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986) to show how centralization affects denomination performance.  In the empirical 
estimation, we examine the number of adherents that US-headquartered denominations attract in 
foreign markets.  The US is the largest exporter of Protestant Christianity, with the country’s 
history of religious freedom fomenting a competitive religious market with churches active in 
expanding abroad (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose.  1996).   
                                                            
1 Recent work has applied market analysis to the Protestant Reformation and the Counter-Reformation (Ekelund, 
Hebert and Tollison, 2006), the development of religion in America (Finke and Stark, 2008), and the designation of 
Catholic saints (Barro, McCleary, and McQuoid, 2010).  
2 See Iannaccone (1998) for a discussion of literature on treating churches as payoff maximizing firms. 2 
 
Christian denominations may seem an unusual application for the analysis of 
multinational enterprises.  Four aspects of global Christianity motivate our study.  One is its 
scale and diversity. Between 1970 and 2005, the share of Christians in the global population 
remained stable at 33%,
3 whereas the share of Protestants among Christians rose from 26% to 
35%, with their growth displacing the traditional church (Catholics and Orthodox).  US 
headquartered denominations have been at the forefront of the recent global expansion in 
Protestantism, building on the earlier work of missionaries who in the 19
th century began to 
evangelize Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Woodberry and Shah, 2004).  However, not all 
Christian groups have been equally successful.  Strikingly, it is Protestant denominations with 
the most restrictive religious doctrine and distinctive worship practices that have enjoyed the 
most growth (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose, 1996).  In 2010, Pentecostalism, a movement that 
originated in the United States in the early 1900s involving ecstatic worship and a literal reading 
of the Bible, along with other so-called “renewalist” groups, had 400 to 600 million adherents 
worldwide, accounting for a quarter of all Christians. While the global expansion of these groups 
has attracted interest from other social sciences (e.g., Meyer, 2004, Robbins, 2004, and 
Woodberry, 2008), it has received little attention from economists. 
A second motivation is that the growth of Protestant Christianity tends to create a more 
dynamic religious marketplace, challenging religious and political elites (Freston, 2001; 
Woodberry and Shaw, 2004).  Protestant denominations vary in their impacts on the political 
landscape.  For example, evangelical Christians are prominent in the United States, whereas 
Pentecostal and charismatic Christians have acquired political clout in Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
elsewhere in East Africa.
4 Recent literature examines the dominance of single religions and 
overall religiosity at the national level.  Barro and McCleary (2005) identify factors that 
determine which countries have state religions; McCleary and Barro (2006) find that the fraction 
of the population that participates in religious activities is decreasing in per capita income and 
government regulation of religion; and Barro and Hwang (2007) relate conversion to major 
religions in a country to religious pluralism, state controls on religion, and the education of the 
populace.  We extend the literature by examining competition among many religious groups, 
which allows us to examine determinants of the composition of religion and to evaluate the 
                                                            
3 According to the World Christian Database (http://www.worldchristiandatabase.org), the share of Christians in the 
global population was 34.5% in 1900, 33.4% in 1970, and 33.0% in 2005. 
4 “Slain by the Spirit,” The Economist, July 3, 2010.  3 
 
market value of specific denominational characteristics.  
A third motivation for our paper is to examine how the provision of social services 
affects the relative demand for religion.  The functions of a congregation include organizing 
worship, educational activities, and charitable undertakings, in which individual congregants are 
both consumers and producers.  These services have the quality of club goods, giving 
congregants an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others.  In seminal work, Iannaccone 
(1992) identifies strictness as a means for religious groups to reduce free riding.  Having a 
stricter religious doctrine constrains individual choice, which raises the cost of secular goods, 
thereby increasing the incentive for individuals to participate in church life.  A related line of 
work suggests that the demand for religion expands when the government decreases the supply 
of public services that compete with church-supplied club goods.  Hungerman (2005) finds that 
member donations and community spending increased in the US Presbyterian church following 
welfare reform in 1996, which reduced government-provided social services; and Gruber and 
Hungerman (2007) find that the expansion in social services under the US New Deal crowded 
out charitable religious activities.  In international settings, Berman (2000) and Chen (2010) use 
Iannaccone (1992) to explain the organization of ultra-orthodox Judaism in Israel and the 
expansion of Islamic worship following the Indonesian financial crisis, respectively.
5 
We bring these strands of literature together by examining how demand for and supply of 
public services affect the relative success of strict denominations in a large number of countries.  
Across countries, there is wide variation in the provision of public services and in exposure to 
health or income shocks that affect demand for these services.  Controlling for denomination and 
country fixed effects, and for the interaction between strictness and a large number of country 
characteristics, we find that stricter denominations attract more members in countries with a 
weaker provision of health services and with higher incidence of natural disasters and disease 
outbreaks.  Placebo tests show no such interaction effect between these country characteristics 
and theoretically irrelevant features of religious doctrine, such as the frequency of communion.  
To take an example from recent headlines, prior to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the largest 
Protestant groups in the country (which included Adventist and Pentecostal churches) were US 
based denominations that maintain a strict religion doctrine.  In the aftermath of the earthquake, 
                                                            
5 Similarly, Scheve and Stasavage (2006) find that across advanced countries there is a negative correlation between 
the intensity of religious belief and government social spending. 4 
 
it appears to be these groups that have seen the sharpest increases in church activity.
6  
A final motivation for our study is to apply recent theoretical developments in 
organizations and international trade (Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009).  In our framework, 
each denomination decides which countries to enter based on local market conditions and its own 
“productivity,” organizational structure, and religious doctrine.  Important for our analysis, a 
denomination’s organization and doctrine are relatively stable over time and common across 
congregations (Melton, 1989; Chaves, 1993b).  We can therefore examine how organizational 
form affects denominational performance, which is distinct from the usual context in which 
multinational organizational structure is endogenous (e.g., Nunn, 2007; Rajan and Wulf, 2006; 
Marin and Verdier, 2008).  Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) examine what makes 
multinational firms more decentralized; we ask the complementary question of where 
decentralized organizations are more likely to succeed.  In our model, entry into a market is 
subject to a fixed cost, which similar to Melitz (2003) keeps low productivity groups from 
entering countries with small markets or high barriers.  To reach adherents, a denomination must 
hire a local pastor to manage a congregation.  Following Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman 
(2006) we assume that transactions between a pastor (manager) and a denomination 
(headquarters) are subject to incomplete contracts.
7  In decentralized denominations, the pastor 
has greater authority, which increases his incentive to exert effort in serving his congregation; in 
centralized denominations, the denominational headquarters has greater authority, which gives it 
more control over how congregations operate.   
The model predicts that in countries in which the productivity of pastor effort is higher, 
decentralized denominations will have larger membership, due to pastors having stronger effort 
incentives.  To test the prediction, we capture the productivity of pastor effort in a country using 
the availability of communication and transportation infrastructure.  In linking labor productivity 
with infrastructure, we follow recent literature in public finance and macroeconomics (e.g., 
Fernald, 1999; Roller and Waverman, 2001).  The return on pastor effort depends on his ability 
to connect with congregants, which is a function of the ease of local communications and the 
cost of internal transport.  We find that decentralized denominations attract more members in 
                                                            
6 See Tom Phillips, “Religion Fills Void Left by Aid Agencies,” The Guardian, Jan. 25, 2010; Anne Barnard, 
“Suffering, Haitians Turn to Charismatic Prayer”, New York Times, November 24, 2010; Kwame Dawes, “Amid 
Disasters, A Preacher Holds Fast to His Faith in Haiti,” USA Today, Jan. 5, 2011; and Christophe Wargny, “Haiti in 
the Hands of the NGOs,” Counterpunch, Jan. 7, 2011. 
7 See Allen (1995) for an incomplete contracts view of church organization. 5 
 
countries with better communications and land transportation.  Placebo tests show that no such 
interaction effect exists for air transportation, which is unlikely to affect pastor productivity.  
The relative success of less hierarchical organizations thus appears to depend on the productivity 
of agents with managerial responsibilities.   
In section 2, we present our data on the size, religious doctrine, and governance structure 
of denominations.  In section 3, we present a model of entry and competition among religious 
groups and derive the empirical specifications.  In section 4, we present results from estimating 
the model.  And in section 5, we offer final discussion. 
 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SETTING 
2.1 Christian denominations 
The data for our analysis are from the World Christian Database (WCD).  The WCD 
tracks religious affiliation for Christian denominations across countries, giving numbers of 
affiliated members and congregations in 1970 and 2005.
8  Each denomination is identified by its 
name, religious tradition (e.g., Baptist, Holiness-Pentecostal, Reformed-Presbyterian), and 
megabloc, and is accompanied by information on its international affiliation.  Megablocs include 
Roman Catholics, Orthodox, and Anglicans, which constitute the historic or traditional church; 
conventional Protestants; Independents, which includes churches that have split from Protestant 
denominations or that are unaffiliated with international church bodies; and Marginals, which are 
groups considered outside the Christian mainstream, the largest of which are the Mormons and 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  With some abuse of terminology, we use the term Protestant to refer to 
four WCD blocs:  Anglicans, traditional Protestants, Independents, and Marginals. 
In the raw WCD, there are over 6,300 individual denominations, which represent a much 
smaller number of denominational aggregates that share an international governing body, 
internal organizational structure, and religious doctrine.  We form denominational aggregates by 
combining sub-denominations that have a common (a) megabloc, (b) religious tradition, and (c) 
                                                            
8 The WCD is maintained by Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary and builds on material originally published in 
the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) by Barret, Kurian, and Johnson (2001).  The WCE compiled periodic 
censuses that individual Christian denominations conduct of their membership and produced initial estimates of the 
number of adherents by denomination in 1970.  These estimates were cross-checked against information obtained 
from national censuses, national church bodies, and interviews of church leaders.  The WCD further updates 
denomination counts in the WCE to 2005, based on cross-correlated information from 5,000 questionnaires of 
national church bodies, field surveys in 200 countries, a large body of published and unpublished contemporary 
material provided by individual churches, and interviews of bishops, church leaders, and theologians. 6 
 
name or association with an international governing organization.
9   
In the empirical analysis, we focus on Protestant denominations headquartered in the 
United States.  Three features of the data motivate this choice.  First, because of the history of 
religious freedom and separation of church and state in the United States, US denominations 
survive because of their success in the marketplace and not because of preferential government 
treatment (Finke and Stark, 2008).
10  Second, the US is the largest single exporter of Protestant 
Christianity.  Figure 1 shows the share of global Protestants outside of the United States by the 
headquarters country of the denomination.
11  Between 1970 and 2005, the share of Christians 
belonging either to the Anglican Church (headquartered in the UK) or to other non-US-
headquartered denominations each fell, the former from 14% to 10% and the latter from 17% to 
15%.  Denominations headquartered in the United States saw their market share rise from 13% to 
23%. Third, outside sources, including The Handbook of Denominations in the United States, 
(Mead, Hill, and Atwood, 2001), allow us to identify the universe of US denominations and 
thereby verify the completeness of the WCD.  Our sample includes 130 US denominations that 
have adherents abroad enumerated in the WCD.
12 
The denominations in our sample have distinct historical origins.  Mainline traditions 
include movements brought from Europe to the United States in the 17
th and 18
th centuries (e.g., 
Congregationalists, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Quakers).  They include the oldest 
US Protestant groups and tend to be relatively liberal in religious doctrine.  Figure 2 shows that 
in 2005 mainline denominations accounted for 12% of adherents outside of the United States that 
belong to US denominations, down from 23% in 1970.  Evangelical and fundamentalist 
denominations, such as Southern Baptists, include groups that split off from mainline 
denominations in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, typically over doctrinal disputes. These groups 
                                                            
9 In some countries, owing to government regulation of religion, the WCD groups denominations into “union of 
bodies of different traditions.”  We drop a country from the sample if more than 20% of its affiliated Christians fall 
into this category.  These include six large nations (Australia, Canada, China, Congo, Germany, and Pakistan) and 
10 small ones, which in 2005 represented 13% of Christians in the WCD. 
10 While religious organizations in the United States receive preferential tax treatment, these benefits are available to 
all religious institutions and do not favor specific groups.  
11  Unclassified or Independent denominations are congregations with an unknown denominational affiliation 
(mainly very small congregations) or that have no denominational affiliation.   
12 We begin with 204 Protestant denominations headquartered in the United States.  Of these, 16 are not found in the 
WCD (including some older groups that have been subsumed into newer denominations and some very small groups 
not captured by the WCD), 42 have no congregations in the WCD outside of the US (including old denominations in 
the process of dying out and a few recently created entities with minimal foreign presence), 8 have congregations 
outside the US but only in countries excluded from the sample owing to aggregation problems (see note 9), and 8 are 
very small denominations on which we could find no information on their organization or doctrine. 7 
 
maintain strict religious beliefs.   From 1970 to 2005, their share of foreign adherents in US 
denominations fell somewhat, from 29% to 25%.
13 
The fastest growing traditions are Christian renewalists, which include Pentecostals and 
Charismatics, and non-mainstream groups, including the Seventh Day Adventists, Mormons, and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Pentecostalism, now a century old, has a strict religious doctrine similar to 
evangelicals and fundamentalists but also espouses a belief that speaking in tongues (glossolalia) 
is evidence that one has been baptized spiritually.  Speaking in tongues, and other ecstatic 
practices including healing and prophesying, are essential to Pentecostal worship, which makes it 
distinct theologically from other Protestants (Robbins, 2004).  For the last 100 years, there has 
been debate within Christianity over speaking in tongues, with many fundamentalists rejecting 
the practice (Melton, 1989).
14  Between 1970 and 2005, the share of foreign adherents in US 
denominations belonging to Pentecostal or other renewalist groups rose from 22% to 37%.       
Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses are considered outside the Christian mainstream 
because they accept religious texts other than the Christian Bible.  Additionally, Mormons 
maintain a strict dietary regimen, rigid guidelines on charitable giving, and a requirement that 
young men provide two years of missionary service; Jehovah’s Witnesses have an elaborate 
theology surrounding the end of the world and are required to go door-to-door to convert non-
believers.  Between 1970 and 2005, these two groups, plus Seventh Day Adventists, saw their 
share of foreign adherents belonging to US denominations rise from 16% to 21%.
15 
Table 1 lists the 35 largest Protestant denominations worldwide (based on their adherents 
outside the US), of which 24 are headquartered in the United States.  The size of denominations 
varies immensely, with the largest US denomination (Assemblies of God) having 42.4 million 
adherents outside of the United States in 2005, the 10
th largest (United Methodist Church USA) 
having 3.7 million, the 30
th  largest (Pentecostal Church of God) having 0.6 million, and all 
denominations below the 80
th rank having fewer than 0.1 million.  Figure 3a plots for US 
denominations the number of adherents abroad against the number of adherents in the United 
States.  The strong positive relationship indicates that denominations successful in the United 
                                                            
13 Another schismatic tradition, the Holiness Movement, split off from mainline Methodists in the late 19
th century.  
It emphasizes the restrictive doctrine of sanctification, in which believers purify themselves of sin (and are then to 
sin no more).  Between 1970 and 2005, their share of foreign adherents of US denominations fell from 12% to 6%. 
14 The Charismatic movement, which emerged in the United States in the 1960s, includes individuals who left 
mainline denominations and now embrace speaking in tongues. 
15 The other Marginal category in Figure 2 includes very small denominations outside the Christian mainstream. 8 
 
States are also successful globally, consistent with a Melitz (2003) style framework. 
There is also variation in the number of countries in which denominations operate.  Most 
denominations are present in fewer than a dozen countries.  Table 2 shows the number of 
countries in the estimation sample in which US denominations have a presence in 1970 and in 
2005.  In 1970, only 10.9% of country-denomination cells have positive entries; by 2005, the 
share rises to 13.5%. As seen in Figure 3b, US denominations that attract more adherents in the 
United States (and presumably are more “productive”) are present in more countries abroad.  In 
the empirical analysis, we address the entry of denominations into countries in order to control 
for possible selection bias in estimating determinants of denomination size. 
 
2.2 Denominational doctrine and governance 
In the production of religious services, the church is the factory, the pastor is the 
manager, and, given that worship is a collective activity, congregants are both workers and 
consumers (Iannaccone, 1998).  The denomination provides the intellectual property used in 
production, which includes religious doctrine and a system of governance (Chaves, 1993a).   
Denominations range in form from loose membership associations to rigidly hierarchical bodies.  
We code denominations according to the their governance structure and the strictness of their 
religious doctrine, using information from Melton (1989), Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001), 
the World Christian Database, and denomination websites.  In many cases, the core elements of a 
denomination’s doctrine and governance were established by a religious entrepreneur who 
founded the organization.
16  In the early years of a movement, some elements of doctrine and 
structure are malleable but once codified tend to change only slowly over time (Melton, 1989; 
Chaves and Sutton, 2004; Finke and Stark, 2008). 
Congregations that belong to a denomination share a defined religious doctrine, given in 
the denomination’s statement of faith.  The doctrine is a system of belief that is in part what 
attracts adherents to church.  Christianity is organized around the life and teachings of Jesus 
Christ, as described in the New Testament of the Christian Bible.  Following Hoge (1979), 
Iannaccone (1998), and Ekelund, et al. (2006), we define strict religious doctrine to include the 
following beliefs:  (a) the Bible is the literal word of God and therefore infallible, (b) to become 
                                                            
16 For example, Aimee Semple McPherson founded the Foursquare Church, Joseph Smith founded the Mormons, 
Charles Taze Russell founded the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  See Allen (1995) for case studies of church foundings. 9 
 
a Christian one must openly repent one’s sins and accept Christ as lord and savior (be “born 
again”), (c) one should try actively to convert others to Christianity, (d) Christ will return to earth 
soon and believers should prepare for his second coming, (e) those who have not converted are 
damned to an eternal life of suffering in hell, (f) one should dress modestly, avoid smoking or 
drinking, keep sexual activity within marriage, and avoid situations that conflict with these 
mores, (g) believers should be sanctified and thereby purified from sin (as in the Holiness 
movement; see note 13), (h) speaking in tongues is evidence of one’s baptism in the Holy Spirit 
(as in Pentecostalism), and (i) divine healing is an ongoing practice available to believers.  Each 
of these beliefs imposes time costs, lifestyle constraints, and impediments to maintaining 
relationships with non-Christians or Christians in other denominations.  In the language of 
Iannaccone (1992), they stigmatize believers, raising the cost of participating in secular activities 
and helping other adherents identify those willing to be active in the life of a congregation. 
Table 3 gives the share of US denominations that abide by the beliefs (a)-(i), above.  
Some beliefs – evangelism, repentance and conversion, infallibility of the Bible, and damnation 
of non-believers – are common to most groups, with at least 70% of US denominations adopting 
one of these beliefs.  The others – the imminence of Christ’s second coming, sanctification, 
speaking in tongues, restrictions on dress, and divine healing – are less common.  The second set 
of beliefs represents the dimensions along which strict groups differentiate themselves.  For 
example, the Assemblies of God, a Pentecostal denomination, endorses speaking in tongues but 
not sanctification.  The Church of the Nazarene, a conservative denomination associated with the 
Holiness Movement, endorses sanctification but not speaking in tongues.  Both endorse divine 
healing, though they differ on the imminence of Christ’s second coming. 
To measure strictness in an environment in which denominations are differentiated, we 
define a denomination to be strict if the row mean of the nine doctrinal dummy variables is 
greater than or equal to 0.5, which applies to 45% of the denominations in the sample.  Figure 4 
shows the distribution for the row mean of the nine doctrine variables for US denominations.  
The cutoff of 0.5 captures a break in the distribution between the top two quintiles of 
denominations and the rest; the cutoff divides denominations between those above the median 
and those at the median or below.  Empirical results presented in section 4 are robust to raising 
the strictness cutoff to 0.6, which reduces the share of strict denominations to 32%, and to 
dropping any individual dimension of strictness from the calculation of the row mean. 10 
 
In Iannaccone’s (1992) club good model of religious organizations, which we incorporate 
into our model of denominations in section 3, stricter groups elicit greater participation from 
their members by raising the perceived cost of secular goods and services.  To examine how 
strictness relates to religious participation among the denominations in our data, we use the 
General Social Surveys in 2000, 2002, and 2004, which sample the U.S. population on religion, 
politics, and social behavior.  The GSS contains detailed data on the denominational affiliation of 
individuals who self-identify as Protestant, where the GSS denominations span two thirds of 
those in our data.
17  In unreported results, we find that, controlling for age, gender, and 
educational degree, individuals in the GSS belonging to strict denominations (according to our 
definition) are 25% more likely than individuals in non-strict denominations to attend religious 
services at least once a week.  These findings are consistent with survey evidence from other 
sources (Iannaccone, 1998), which show that the strictness of the religious group to which 
individuals belong correlates positively with the time and money that individuals contribute to 
church organizations.  In the US, strict denominations thus succeed in attracting individuals with 
a relatively strong willingness to participate actively in church life. 
In terms of organization, belonging to a denomination means a congregation agrees to 
govern itself according to a pre-specified structure.  There is well-recognized variation in the 
degree of centralization among denominational governance systems.
18  The most decentralized 
system is a congregational polity, in which the congregation retains control over the hiring and 
firing of pastors and religious doctrine (Chaves, 1993b).  The denomination, through national or 
international bodies, operates at arms’ length.  It provides congregations with a range of services, 
including recommending pastoral candidates, providing guidance on theology, publishing 
educational material, training pastors and lay leaders, extending loans for church construction, 
organizing national ministries to reach new converts, raising funds to support global operations, 
and organizing relief in response to disasters (as in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake).  In 
return for these services, congregations pay fees to the denomination.
19  Local churches, in 
effect, use the denomination as a consulting service. 
                                                            
17  For one-third of the individuals in the GSS, the denomination affiliation given (e.g., Other Baptist, Other 
Presbyterian, Church of God) is too aggregate to match to the denominations in our sample.   
18 Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) suggest that regional variation in the organization of religion may affect 
organizational choices by private firms.  They find that multinational firms are more prone to centralized decision 
making in regions in which hierarchical religions (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam) are more prevalent. 
19 In the United States, individual congregations on average keep 79% of the revenues they generate, a share that has 
remained stable over time (Chaves, 1998).   11 
 
In centralized denominations, control rights reside not in the congregation but higher up 
in the denominational hierarchy.  Denominational bodies above the congregation screen 
applicants to the ministry, assign pastors to churches, discipline pastors, and set religious 
doctrine for member churches.  The denomination, in effect, has the power to license its brand – 
including the denomination name, religious doctrine, and governance structure – to individual 
congregations and decide who will manage each church.  There are two common forms of 
centralized governance.  In an episcopal (or connectional) structure, power resides in the 
bishopric, as in the United Methodist Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and the Mormon 
Church.  The chief authority over congregations within a region is a bishop, who ordains pastors, 
assigns pastors to churches, adjudicates disputes, and performs administrative duties.  A council 
of bishops controls church doctrine.  A second hierarchical system is the presbyterian structure, 
as in the Presbyterian Church USA and the Reformed Church.  Power resides in a regional 
governing body known as the presbytery, which consists of a pastor and an elder from each 
congregation, and other church leaders.  The presbytery ordains, installs, and removes pastors 
and establishes and dissolves congregations.  Above the presbytery is a general assembly, which 
resolves disputes at the presbytery level and settles issues of religious doctrine. 
We define a denomination to be decentralized if it has a congregational polity, which as 
seen in Table 3 applies to 55% of denominations.  Among the denominations, the correlation 
between having a congregational polity and being strict is -0.16, implying that decentralized 
denominations are modestly less likely to have a strict religious doctrine.  
 
2.3 Global expansion by denominations 
Denominations tend to enter a country by supporting missionaries or organizing mass 
revival meetings (Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose, 1996).  Once it has established itself in a market, 
it may grow either by attracting additional members to existing congregations or by adding 
congregations.  Figure 5 plots the log number of affiliated Christians against the log number of 
congregations, where each data point represents the worldwide total for a denomination.  The log 
linear relationship between affiliated Christians and congregations suggests that global expansion 
by a denomination occurs more on the extensive margin (adding congregations) than on the 
intensive one (adding members to existing congregations). 
To examine the intensive and extensive margins more formally, we follow Eaton, Kortum 12 
 
and Kramarz (2004) and use the identity,  (/) (/ ) jkj k j kkj k k NM NM M M    , where Njk is the 
number of congregations for denomination j in country k,  Mjk  is the number of affiliated 
Christians for denomination j in country k, and Mk is the total number of Christians in country k.  
We then estimate the following two regressions (with robust standard errors in parentheses and 
the constant terms dropped): 
ln   0.846ln 0.794ln
               (0.006)           (0.007)
ln 0.154ln 0.206ln















         
where the sample includes the 130 US denominations across the countries in which they operate. 
By the logic of least squares, across the two regressions the constant and error terms sum to zero 
and the coefficients on each variable sum to one. The magnitude of the coefficients indicates 
how aggregate variation in market size relates to the number of congregations (the extensive 
margin) and Christians per congregation (the intensive margin).  In response to a 10% increase in 
country market size (Mk), the number of congregations increases by 8.5% and members per 
congregation by 1.5%; similarly, in response to a 10% increase in market share for a 
denomination in a country (Mjk / Mk), the number of congregations increases by 7.9% and 
members per congregation by 2.1%.  This is further evidence most adjustment in the size of 
denominations occurs at the extensive margin, through adding congregations. 
 
3. THEORY 
In this section, we present a model of competition between denominations within national 
markets. We proceed by deriving the demand for participation in denominations, characterizing 
the interaction between denomination headquarters and pastors in supplying religious services, 
solving for the market equilibrium, and, finally, deriving comparative statics for denomination 
size, where we distinguish denominations by their strictness and governance structure. 
 
3.1. Model setup and the demand for religion 13 
 
Each country, k, has many regional markets, indexed by m.  In market m of country k, a 
total number of 
m
k O individuals choose among religious organizations.  To enter a country, a 
denomination incurs a fixed cost, fk, which captures the cost of sending missionaries abroad or 
organizing a ministry.  To be present in a regional market, a denomination must establish a 
congregation, which requires a fixed cost, fck.
20  A denomination provides the congregation with 
access to its credence goods, whose value in utility is δjk.  Each congregation is managed by a 
pastor, who serves members at marginal cost, gk, plus the cost of his effort, given by, 
( ) exp( ),
mm
jk k jk ce he            ( 1 )  
per member of the congregation, where hk > 0 affects effort costs. Following Besley and 
Ghatak’s (2005) formulation of objectives in non-profit organizations, we assume that the pastor 
values both the number of congregation members, with weight γ, and monetary income from 
serving the congregation.  Likewise, a denomination values the number of believers it attracts, 
also with weight γ, as well as the monetary income its congregations generate.
21 
Members of the congregation enjoy services provided by the church and contribute time 
and money to help provide worship services, outreach to new members, charitable activities, and 
other club goods.  We adopt a discrete choice framework and specify that the utility for person i 
in country k from participating in denomination j in local market m, 
m
ijk u , is given by, 
() ( . , )
mm m m m
ijk jk k jk jk jk ijk ue V p      ,  αk > 0,                    (2) 
where 
m
jk e  is the pastor’s effort level and the term αk
m
jk e  captures the pastor’s contribution to the 
quality of religious services perceived by congregants. When αk is high, the marginal impact of 
pastor effort on utility is large. The price, 
m
jk p , is a per-person membership fee, which may take 
                                                            
20 Effectively, we assume that to serve a market a denomination must engage in foreign direct investment, implying 
that there is no “export” option.  In practice, some denominations do reach members through radio and television 
programming, which are forms of exporting religious services.  Since we lack data on the extent to which individual 
denominations use radio and TV ministries, such activities are outside of the scope of our analysis. 
21 As compared with Besley and Ghatak (2005), we (i) assume that the principal and the agent have the same 
mission objective (i.e., congregation membership) and so abstract away from the matching between principals and 
agents, and (ii) consider an incomplete-contract environment.  The weighting parameter, γ, affects the price level 
(see equations (5) and (8)) and so denomination size, but does not affect how denomination size varies with the key 
parameters of our model, αk, hk, and πSjk. Therefore, Propositions 1 and 2, below, still hold even if the denomination 
and the pastor place different utility weights on the number of believers. 14 
 
the form of volunteer work or donations.
22 
m
ijk   is an iid extreme value error term, observable to 
person i. We motivate 
m
jk V  (.) using the club-good model of Iannaccone (1992), where each 
congregation is a club and members take congregation size as given. Each member consumes a 
secular good, whose quantity is 
m
ijk S  and whose shadow price is πSjk, and participates in the 
congregation at intensity level 
m
ijk R  , with shadow price πRjk. We assume shadow prices are 
constant across regions within a country.  The quality of club goods produced by a congregation 
is increasing in the average participation intensity of its members, 
m
jk Q .  Congregation members 
choose 
m
ijk S   and 
m
ijk R   to maximize sub-utility,  (,,)
mmm
c ijk ijk jk uS R Q , taking the choices of other 
members as given, and subject to the budget constraint, πSjk
m
ijk S  + πRjk
m
ijk R  ≤
m
ijk I  – 
m
jk p , where 
m
ijk I  
is income and we assume an interior solution with positive participation.
23 For each member of 
the congregation, 
m
jk V  (πSjk, πRjk,
m
ijk I  – 
m
jk p ,Qjk) is the indirect utility of the club good at the Nash 
equilibrium. 
Following Iannaccone (1992) we model the strictness of a denomination as a tax that 
increases the shadow price of the secular good:  πSjk = πSk + πSj, where πSj is high if denomination 
j is strict. Strictness imposes time costs or other constraints on consuming secular goods, which 
lowers real income.
24  But strictness also raises individual and average participation intensity in a 
congregation (as long as the secular good and church participation are substitutes), consistent 
with our findings from the GSS discussed in section 2.  Iannaccone (1992) shows that the utility 
gains from higher participation can more than offset the loss in real income:  ∂
m
jk V /∂πSjk > 0. We 
show in an appendix the conditions under which it is also true that ∂
2 m
jk V /∂(πSjk)
2 > 0, meaning 
that an increase in the price of secular goods increases marginal utility more for strict groups 
than for less strict ones.  Throughout the analysis, we assume these conditions hold.  Finally, it is 




jk p  < 0; an increase in the membership fee decreases members’ 
                                                            
22 We leave unspecified whether the membership fee is paid in donations of time or money owing to Gruber’s 
(2004) empirical finding that religious giving and religious attendance are substitutes. 
23 In other words, 
m
jk p  does not affect the marginal cost of participation intensity, as we implicitly assume that the 
pastor and the denomination do not internalize the effect of 
m
jk p  on 
m
ijk R .  
24 Consistent with this conception of the costs of religious participation, Lipford and Tollison (2003) find that 
increased religious participation is associated with lower individual income. 15 
 




























  >  0.        (3) 
To match our data we focus on individual choices among Protestant denominations, with 
other religious groups remaining in the background.
25  To derive the total number of individuals 
who participate in denomination j, 
m
jk X , we apply Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) and 




jk k jk jk mm m m











k jk k jk jk j Pe V     ,         (4)  
where 
m
jk   is the market share of denomination j in market m and 
m
k P  measures the 
competitiveness of market m, akin to a price index for religious services.  While we focus on 
Protestant denominations, other religious groups are implicitly captured in the term, 
m
k P , which 




jk p  = – β, 
such that the parameter β > 0 measures the elasticity of demand for church membership; a high β 




jk e  = αk, such that 
denomination size is increasing in the productivity of pastor effort.  
 
3.2 Organizational structure and pastor incentives 
To consider the determination of denomination membership fees and pastor effort, we 
assume timing is as follows.  (i) The denomination decides whether or not to enter country k and 
market m. (ii) Price and effort levels, 
m
jk p  and 
m
jk e , are chosen, which determine congregation 
                                                            
25 Our assumption in equation (2) that 
m
ijk  is iid extreme value implies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  
IIA allows us to estimate the model with data on a subset of the religious choices available to individuals in a 
country.  This approach applies to the following decision structures:  (a) a nested structure in which individuals first 
choose among religious aggregates (e.g., Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, etc.), before choosing among 
individual denominations or groups within these aggregates, in which case our analysis would apply to the 
subbranch of the decision tree that applies to choice among Protestant denominations; or (b) a non-nested structure 
in which individuals choose among all religious groups simultaneously, in which case we would be applying IIA 
and estimating outcomes among the Protestant subset of choices available.  Under either structure, we control for 
unobserved religious options using country fixed effects, which capture market competitiveness, as seen in (4). 16 
 
membership.  (iii) The denomination and pastor bargain over the monetary surplus generated in 
market  m (Grossman and Hart, 1986).  Bargaining results from incomplete contracts, as we 
assume that no contract can be written at stage (ii) to govern trade at stage (iii).  We assume both 
parties’ outside options are 0 and that each gets half the monetary surplus. 
We classify the organizational structure of a denomination as decentralized (D) or 
centralized (C), which is chosen by the denomination at an earlier time and taken as given.  
Under the D structure, the pastor has control rights over a congregation, which gives him the 
right to choose the membership fee, 
m
jk p .
26  The joint monetary surplus for the congregation is 
m
jk X  (
m
jk p  – gk), meaning the pastor’s payoff is, 
m
jk X γ + 0.5
m
jk X  (
m






The first order conditions for effort and the membership fee are, respectively, 
1
'( ) ( ) [ ( )]
2
DD D
kj k kj k k k ce c e p g      ,        (5) 
1
2[ ( ) ]
DD
kk k pg c e 

 .         ( 6 )  
Due to logit demand in (4), indirect utility, 
m
jk V , and market competitiveness, 
m
k P , do not affect 
fees or effort, though they do affect the number of adherents; in the rest of this subsection, we 
drop the index for region (m) and denomination (j).  Equation (5) says that a higher fee provides 
the pastor with stronger incentives to exert effort, as the left-hand side of (5) is increasing in 
effort.  Equation (5) also says that the pastor has stronger incentives to exert effort when his 
productivity is higher (αk is larger) or his marginal effort cost, hk, is lower.  Equation (6) says that 
an increase in effort cost,  ()
D
k ce  , leads to a more than one-for-one increase in membership fees.  
This is due to the hold-up problem under incomplete contracts.  Since the pastor captures only 
half of the monetary surplus, he is not fully compensated for his effort.  To alleviate hold-up, he 
                                                            
26 Consider the following extension to incorporate elements of the framework describing the delegation of authority 
in Aghion and Tirole (1997). Suppose the project of congregation-building is the vector (connection, membership 
fee), where a successful connection between the pastor and members of the congregation causes the utility of 
members to rise. There is uncertainty about the correct way to connect with members, with a pastor-preferred 
connection option and a denomination-preferred connection option. The D structure allocates formal authority over 
the vector (connection, membership fee) to the pastor.  Compared with our current framework, the pastor has even 
stronger effort incentives under the D structure since he can choose not only his preferred price but also his preferred 
connection. Such a setting would strengthen results derived below.  
27 In our setting the allocation of control rights has no impact on bargaining power. To relax this assumption, 
suppose control rights increase bargaining power. Then under the D structure the pastor has even stronger incentives 
since he receives more than half the surplus. This setting would strengthen our results. In other words, our results 
hold up as long as control rights do not decrease bargaining power too much.  17 
 
over-compensates his effort in pricing.  In (6), the pastor internalizes only his own non-monetary 
benefit to believers and not the denomination’s. The other terms in (6) say that the membership 











 .           (7) 
Equation (7) says that pastor effort is high when effort has a large marginal contribution to 
demand (αk is high) or when the effort cost, hk, is low.  
Under the C structure, the control rights over the congregation rest with the 
denomination, such that the denomination chooses the membership fee.  Since the 
denomination’s payoff is θXjk + Xjk(pjk – gk)/2 – fck,







.          ( 8 )  
Equations (6) and (8) imply that the membership fee is lower under the C structure than under 
the D structure:  
C
k p  <
D
k p .  This is because the cost of pastor effort does not enter into the 
denomination’s payoff, leading the denomination to ignore the effort cost in pricing.  Equations 
(1) and (4) still hold under the C structure, and the first order condition for pastor effort is still 
equation (5), except that fee is 
C













.         ( 9 )  
Equations (6) and (9) say that the effort level is lower under the C structure than the D structure:  
C
k e  < 
D
k e .  Under the C structure, the price-setting right rests with the denomination, which 
ignores the effort cost in its pricing decision.  For the pastor, lack of control rights under the C 
structure aggravates the hold-up problem, creating weak incentives to invest in effort.   
To summarize, the denomination and the pastor disagree about pricing; the denomination 
prefers the lower price, 
C
k p , (as defined in (8)) but the pastor prefers the higher price, 
D
k p  (as 
defined in (6)).  Relative to the C structure, the D structure provides stronger incentives to the 
pastor by allocating control rights to him, which results in high effort but also a high membership 
                                                            
28 We choose to have the denomination bear the church fixed cost, fck, in order to simplify the expressions for the 
entry threshold and the number of churches and believers. Who bears fck has no effect on the first order conditions.  18 
 
fee.
29 Since we do not observe effort levels or membership fees in our data, we next examine 
predictions about the numbers of believers and congregations under the C and D structures.   
 
3.3 Market equilibrium and denomination size 
To examine the number of adherents and congregations in country k for denomination j 
we aggregate across religious markets m within country k for a given denomination.  We first 
derive results under the D structure; results for the C structure are analogous.  Under the D 
structure, the denomination is active in markets where pastor utility is non-negative. Plugging (6) 
and (7) into pastor utility, the denomination enters local market m if and only if 
, mD





 ,        ( 1 0 )  
where 
, mD
jk X  is given by (4) with price and effort level equal to 
D
k p  and 
D
k e .  Intuitively, the 
denomination enters larger markets and markets with lower entry and trade costs.  We rewrite the 
population in local market m as 
m
k O  = Oksm, where sm is the size of local market m, with cdf Gk(.) 
and pdf gk(.), and Ok is a shifter reflecting the total population of country k.  It follows that the 
regional competitiveness index is given by 
m
k P  = 
D
jk  Oksm, where 
D
jk   is given by (4) with price, 
D
k p , and effort, 
D
k e .  
D
jk  , the market share of denomination j, is constant across markets in k 








            ( 1 1 )  
Equation (11) says that a denomination enters more markets the lower is the fixed cost, the larger 
is country k, or the higher is a denomination’s market share.  In country k, the denomination has 
D




kk s gs d s

 =  1( )
D
kk Gs    congregations and 
D




jkk k k k s Os g s d s 

  adherents.   
Following the urban economics literature (Gabaix, 2009), we assume the distribution of regional 
market size, Gk(.), is Pareto with lower bound b and shape parameter a, such that Gk(s) = 1 – 
(b/s)
a.  It follows that,
30 
                                                            
29 Consistent with these predictions, in US congregations pastor salaries rise more quickly with church attendance in 
denominations with congregational polities than in hierarchical denominations (McMillan and Price, 2003).   
30 Pk and Vjk are invariant across markets because price, effort level, and market share are invariant across markets. 19 
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jk n , does not depend on market size or 
market share and that all the adjustment of 
D
jk X  is through the extensive margin, 
D
jk n , broadly 
consistent with the empirical findings in subsection 2.3.  Such predictions are typical of models 
with firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003). To determine the condition under which a denomination 
enters country k, note that the denomination receives variable profits 0.5
m
jk X  (
m
jk p  – gk) from 
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k p  – gk) 
D
jk X  from 
country k.  Using the expression for 
D
jk X  in (12), denomination j enters country k if  
1
1 ln ln ln ln














 ≥  ln fk.       (13)  
Under the C structure, we can derive the entry threshold, market share, and total number 
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 ≥ lnfk.    (15) 
With these results in hand, we derive comparative statics.  We first examine the effect of 
religious doctrine on denomination size. We consider how shocks to the market for secular goods 20 
 
affect the relative size of strict groups.  From club-good utility, changes in the price of the 
secular good change the demand for strictness.  For denomination j in country k, we assume that 
the shadow price for the secular good can be decomposed as, πSjk = πSj + πhk + πdk, for all local 
markets m.  πSj is high for the adherents of denomination j if denomination j is strict; πhk is high 
for the population of country k if country k has a weak supply of social services (implying higher 
queuing costs and therefore higher shadow prices for these services); and πdk is high for country 
k if there is strong demand for social services. The first property follows Iannaccone’s (1992) 
conception that membership in a strict religious group raises the cost of consuming secular 
goods.  The second property follows from the standard notion that price is negatively correlated 
with supply shocks.  And the third property holds because the indirect utility function, Vjk(.), 
implies that the marginal utility of the secular good is ∂uc(.)/∂Sjk = [∂V(.)/∂Ik]πSjk, where uc(.) is 
the (direct) club-good utility. Strong demand for social services increases the marginal utility of 
the secular good and so raises its price, πSjk.
31   
What happens to participation in denominations when the shadow price of the secular 
good increases?  Suppose, for instance, that the availability of social services in country k falls. 
Then πhk increases, and utility increases for all denominations in country k, strict or not, since 
∂V/∂πS > 0, by equation (3). This outcome is consistent with the findings that church-provided 
services compete with government-run welfare programs in Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and 
Hungerman (2007).  However, there is an additional effect, as well.  The increase in indirect 
utility is higher for strict denominations, for which πSjk is higher, since ∂
2V/∂(πS)
2 > 0 by equation 
(3).  In other words, strict denominations face a relatively large increase in demand if 
government provision of social services falls. Summarizing, 
 
Proposition 1 Weaker government provision of (and/or stronger demand for) social 

























where G = X, n and O = D, C.  
The appendix contains the proof. 
Turning to the effect of organizational structure on size, by equations (12) and (14), the 
                                                            
31 We assume that the increase in the marginal utility of the secular good dominates the change in the marginal 
utility of income. This holds, for example, when the club-good utility, uc(.), is homothetic in income. 21 
 
size of a decentralized denomination relative to a centralized one is, 
ln ln [ ( ) ( )]
DD
jk jk DC D C





     .     (16) 
Equation (16) implies that there is an ambiguous ranking of absolute size for centralized and 
decentralized denominations, as such a comparison depends on all the elements of the indirect 
utility function Vjk(.).  However, we can examine the differential impacts that a change in the 
marginal contribution (or cost) of pastor effort has on the size of decentralized and centralized 
denominations. Suppose αk increases (or hk decreases). Then pastor effort increases and size 
increases for both C and D structures. Intuitively, given that the D structure provides the pastor 
with stronger incentives, the increase in αk should have a larger impact under the D structure. We 
show in an appendix that
32 
Proposition 2.  A change in the marginal contribution or marginal cost of pastor effort has 
























 where G = X, n. 
To summarize, our model generates two predictions:  (1) Doctrine:  Weaker provision of 
(or stronger demand for) social services raises the number of adherents and congregations more 
for strict denominations than less strict ones (Proposition 1); and (2) Organization:  An increase 
in the marginal value of pastor effort (or decrease in effort cost) raises the numbers of adherents 
                                                            
32 It is possible to extend the analysis to ownership of church property. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), we 
assume that ownership and control rights rest with the same party.  Under the D structure the local congregation 
owns the church, but under the C structure the denomination owns the church.  In practice, under a congregational 
polity, the congregation tends to own church buildings, while under episcopal or presbyterian polities, the 
denomination typically controls church property.  Ownership affects the pastor’s incentives by changing his outside 
option, should bargaining fail.  Under the D structure, the denomination’s outside option remains 0, but the pastor 
controls the church and should bargaining fail the pastor converts the church into an independent entity, in which 
case the denomination input no longer affects demand.  We assume that the monetary surplus shrinks to the fraction 
D
k d < 1 of the size when bargaining is successful. The denomination then gets fraction (1 – 
D
k d )/2 of the monetary 
surplus in bargaining, while the pastor receives fraction (1+
D
k d )/2.  Under the C structure, the denomination owns 
the church. Should bargaining fail, pastor effort no longer affects demand and the monetary surplus collected by the 
denomination shrinks to the fraction 
C
k d < 1 of the size under successful bargaining. The pastor’s outside option is 0. 
The denomination receives the share (1+
C
k d )/2 of the monetary surplus in bargaining and the pastor receives the 
share (1 – 
C
k d )/2.  Other derivations go through and Propositions 1 and 2 hold. 22 
 
and congregations more for a decentralized denomination than a centralized one (Proposition 2). 
Although we have focused on Protestant denominations in deriving these predictions, our 
framework can be applied to competition among  other religious groups, as well.  
 
3.4 Empirical Specifications 
To take our predictions to the data, we show in an appendix that we can obtain the 
following second-order Taylor approximation for the indirect utility function: 
  01 (,)
OO
jkk k S j k R j k Vp c c I J       ,     O = D, C,          (17) 
where  (,) Sjk Rjk J    is a second-order polynomial involving the shadow prices for secular goods, 
πSjk and πRjk, and the c’s are constants. We assume that πRjk is country-k specific and denote the 
vector (Ik, πRk) by Zk.  We also assume that the general quality of denomination j’s credence 
good in country k is δjk = ςj – c3tjk, where  
jk k jk jk td     .           ( 1 8 )  
τk is trade costs common to denominations in country k,  djk is trade costs in k specific to 
denomination  j (e.g., distance to denomination headquarters), and ηjk is an iid random cost 
(which allows the ranking of denominations across countries to differ).  Finally, we measure πhk 
and πdk using the vector Hk, which includes the supply of and demand for social services in 
country k, and πSj by the strictness of denomination j, STRj (recall that πSjk = πdk + πhk + πSj). We 
then have the following empirical specification for 
O
jkj k V   : 
O
jkj k V   = γj + γk + c2ZkSTRj + η1HkSTRj – c3tjk,      O = D, C,      (19) 
where γj and γk are denomination and country fixed effects, which absorb the variables with j- 
and k-specific subscripts (e.g. 
O
k p , Zk, and ςj). By Proposition 1, the coefficient η1 < 0.  
Plugging equation (19) into (12) and (14), it follows that, 
 
ln ( , )
OO
jkk k Xf h   + γj + γk + c2ZkSTRj + η1HkSTRj – c3tjk, 
ln ( , )
OO
jkk k nf h   + γj + γk + c2ZkSTRj + η1HkSTRj – c3tjk,       (20) 
where the c’s are constants, O = {Decentralized, Centralized}, and the fixed effects γj and γk 23 
 
have absorbed the j (denomination) and k (country) specific variables.  In equation (20), 
O
jk X and 
O
jk n are, respectively, the numbers of adherents and congregations that denomination j has in 
country k, and αk (hk) is the marginal value (cost) of pastor effort in country k. Proposition 2 
implies that  //
DC
kk ff      (i.e., increases in the marginal product of pastor effort have a 
larger positive impact on the size of decentralized denominations than on centralized ones) and 
that //
DC
kk f hfh    . We approximate  (.)
O f by λ1Rk + η2RkDECj, where Rk measures the 
productivity of pastor effort in country k and DECj measures the decentralization of 
denomination j, where by Proposition 2, η2 > 0.  Equation (20) implies the following regressions: 
 
  ln jk X = γj + γk + η2RkDECj + η1HkSTRj + λ3ZkSTRj + λ4tjk + ujk, 
  ln jk n = γj + γk + η2RkDECj + η1HkSTRj + λ3ZkSTRj + λ4tjk + vjk.     (21) 
In equation (21), u jk and vjk are error terms capturing unobserved trade costs (assumed 
uncorrelated with the regressors), and Zk is expanded to include the competitiveness of the 
country’s religious market (Pk) and country size (Ok). By Proposition 1, η1 < 0:  stronger supply 
of (or weaker demand for) social services reduces the size of strict denominations by more than 
non-strict ones; by Proposition 2, η2 > 0:  higher productivity of pastor effort increases the size of 
decentralized denominations by more than centralized ones. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Regression variables and estimation method 
Following equation (21), we regress the log size of a denomination in a country, 
measured as the number of adherents or congregations in 2005, on country fixed effects, γk, 
denomination fixed effects, γj, and interactions between country and denomination 
characteristics.
33  Denomination effects absorb doctrinal strictness and governance structure, the 
quality of a denomination’s credence goods, other determinants of denomination productivity, 
and entry barriers specific to a denomination and constant across countries.  Country effects 
absorb national market size (related to population, urbanization, average income, education, 
                                                            
33 Although the WCD counts adherents in 1970 and 2005, we lack data for most regressors prior to 1970, limiting 
our analysis to the 2005 cross section.  However, we do use the 1970 WCD data in our treatment of selection bias. 24 
 
etc.), barriers to the import of religion common across denominations, variable costs in providing 
services to congregants common across denominations, and the competitiveness of the religious 
market in a country (as defined in equation (4)), which captures the variety of religious options 
available in a country (whether Protestant or not).  The key regressors are interactions between a 
denomination’s governance structure (DECj =1 if a denomination has a congregational polity and 
is decentralized) or religious doctrine (STRj =1 if the denomination is above the median in terms 
of doctrinal strictness) and country characteristics that capture the productivity of pastor effort or 
the supply of and demand for social services. Table 4 provides summary statistics.  
Consider first measures of social service demand and supply, Hk.  Berman (2000) and 
Chen (2010) stress the mutual insurance quality of many of the services that religious groups 
provide, which include child care, free meals, help in finding work, basic health care, and other 
charitable offerings.  Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and Hungerman (2007) find that in the 
United States state expansion of social services crowds out church activities.  Consistent with 
these findings, we assume that the club goods produced by congregations substitute for social 
services provided by the state.  In terms of state-provided social services, we focus on public 
resources that assist individuals in weathering health shocks.  In many countries, governments 
are the primary providers of health services, especially for the poor or middle class.  We examine 
whether more expansive public health services means weaker demand for services provided by 
religious groups, where we measure availability of health services using medical personnel 
(nurses and midwives) per capita,
34 log hospital beds per capita, and health expenditure as a 
share of GDP, from World Development Indicators averaged over 1970-2004. 
The demand for social services provided by the state is likely to be greater where the 
incidence of adverse shocks is higher.  We measure aggregate shocks using the incidences of 
natural disasters and disease outbreaks based on data from the International Emergency Event 
Database (www.emdat.be).  While such shocks are temporary, they are often severe in nature, 
leading to large disruptions in consumption.  Anthropological evidence from traditional societies 
shows that the number of religions present in a region is positively correlated with disease load 
                                                            
34 Physicians are an obvious additional type of medical personnel.  However, in many poor countries physicians play 
a relatively small role in the delivery of health care, with nurses being far more prevalent (Clemens, 2007).  Among 
the poorest 30 countries in the sample, the median nation has 0.5 physicians and 5 nurses per 10,000 people, such 
that the ratio of nurses to physicians is 10 to one.  In the rest of the sample, the ratio of nurses to physicians is 3 to 
one.  Below, we discuss results including physicians per capita interacted with strictness as a regressor but we do not 
include the variable in estimating the principal components of health services. 25 
 
(Fincher and Thornbill, 2008), consistent with the idea that religious organizations provide 
insurance against the risk of contagion.  We measure shock incidence as the number of events 
that occurred in a country over 1970 to 2004 (for disasters) or 1995-2004 (for disease 
outbreaks),
35 divided by the number of years in the period, which is the annualized shock 
incidence.  We define a serious natural disaster as an earthquake over seven on the Richter scale, 
a windstorm (i.e., hurricane) lasting five days or more, or a landslide or volcanic eruption that 
affects more than 1000 people.  Disease measures cover cholera, dengue fever, influenza/SARS, 
and meningococcal outbreaks that affect more than 1000 people.  Serious natural disasters are 
unfortunately common events, with mean annual probabilities of occurrence of 1% (hurricanes) 
to 3% (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions).  Mass disease outbreaks are also common, with mean 
annual occurrence probabilities of 0.3% (influenza/SARS) to 2% (cholera).  We also examine 
how strictness interacts with financial development, which may capture the potential to hedge 
against environmental risk through financial markets. 
Our measure of the productivity of pastor effort, Rk, is the quality of communications and 
transportation infrastructure, including telephone mainlines per capita, cellular subscriptions per 
capita, road network (total length and fraction of roads paved), and passenger cars per capita.
36  
A pastor’s responsibilities include communicating with congregants (to learn about their 
preferences and encourage participation in church events), reaching out to new converts, and 
conferring with church leaders on managing the congregation.  Pastor effort is likely to be more 
productive (or less costly) the better are communication services in a country.  The success of a 
pastor also depends on the number of congregants he is able to attract to his church.  A pastor’s 
geographic reach will be more expansive in countries in which the cost of internal transport is 
lower.  These transport costs depend, in turn, on the size and quality of road networks and the 
availability of passenger vehicles.  Macroeconomics and public finance literatures give abundant 
evidence on how public infrastructure affects industrial productivity.  There is a robust positive 
correlation between public infrastructure, measured in terms of roads and highways or 
telecommunications capacity, and industrial TFP (e.g., Morrison and Schwartz, 1996; Fernald, 
1999; Roller and Waverman, 2001).  We examine whether the productivity effects of 
                                                            
35 We use a shorter window for disease outbreaks than for natural disasters because country coverage of disease 
outbreaks broken by type of disease is incomplete in the1970s and 1980s. 
36 As a matter of convention, we measure usage or access rates (e.g., cellular subscriptions per capita) in levels and 
factor quantities (e.g., hospital beds or passenger cars) as log values (which implicitly are in log per capita terms, 
given that log population interacted with strictness and decentralization appears as a regressor). 26 
 
infrastructure depend on the governance structure of establishments, in our case religious 
denominations.  Infrastructure data are from the WDI, averaged over 1991-2005.
37   
Although we control for country fixed effects, additional country characteristics (e.g., 
education, average income) may have different effects on strict versus non-strict (or centralized 
versus de-centralized) denominations. If these characteristics are correlated with our main 
regressors, the estimation may be subject to omitted-variable bias. To address this concern, we 
include interactions between decentralization and strictness and country characteristics shown to 
correlate with religiosity (Barro and McCleary, 2005; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Sacerdote and 
Glaeser, 2001), including educational attainment, per capita GDP, population size, urbanization, 
life expectancy, the fertility rate, distance from the United States, whether a country’s official 
language is English, government regulation of religion (Grim and Finke, 2006), whether the 
country had a state religion in the past, the rule of law, ethnic fractionalization, the fraction of the 
population that had migrated to the US as of 1970, and indicators for whether Catholicism, 
Islam, Orthodoxy, Hinduism or Buddhism, or Judaism is the dominant religion in a country. We 
also employ placebo tests and examine individual types of natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes) 
and disease outbreaks (e.g., influenza/SARS), as we explain in subsections 4.3 and 4.4. 
Another estimation issue is that most denominations are not present in most countries 
(see Table 2), creating potential problems with sample selection.  We present results based on 
three estimation methods:  OLS, a Heckman (1979) correction for sample selection, and a 
nonparametric correction for sample selection, motivated by Das, Newey, and Vella, (2003).  
The concern with OLS is that the regressors may be correlated with an omitted variable, which is 
the expectation of the error term conditional on a denomination being present in the country.   
In either Heckman or nonparametric approaches, we need variables that are correlated 
with a denomination’s presence in a country in 2005 but not independently correlated with the 
error terms in equation (21).  We use two instruments for denomination presence in 2005.  One 
(available for all denominations) is an indicator for whether the denomination was present in the 
country in 1970, with the identifying assumption being that presence in 1970 is correlated with 
the error for denomination size in 2005 only through denomination and country fixed effects.  A 
second instrument (available for most denominations) is the entry decisions in 1970 of 
                                                            
37 Measures of communications infrastructure are unavailable for many countries before 1990, which accounts for 
why we average their values over a shorter time span than for health services. 27 
 
denominations with a similar number of adherents in the United States.
38  The reasoning behind 
this instrument is that size in the United States, the home country for all denominations in our 
sample, captures a denomination’s average attraction to adherents, similar to firm sales being a 
sufficient statistic for firm productivity in the Melitz (2003) model.  Since denomination 
productivity affects entry, the entry decisions of denominations with similar numbers of US 
adherents are likely to be correlated.  The identifying assumption is that the unobserved barriers 
to entry of similarly US-sized denominations are uncorrelated.  In nonparametric estimation, we 
use a linear probability, probit, or logit model to estimate the probability a denomination is 
present in a country in 2005 and then construct dummy variables that capture the value of the 
predicted probability of presence based on dividing predicted values into 50 equal-sized bins.
39  
We include these dummies in the second-stage regression for log denomination size. 
 
4.2 Main estimation results 
  Table 5 presents baseline OLS results.  We show coefficient estimates for four sets of 
interactions:  between denomination strictness and (a) country incidence of natural disasters, (b) 
country incidence of disease outbreaks, and (c) country health infrastructure; and between a 
denomination being decentralized and country communications and transportation infrastructure.  
The data contain multiple measures of a country’s infrastructure, which are likely to be 
correlated with each other.  Because including these measures together introduces collinearity 
into the regression, we begin by using the first principal component of the infrastructure 
variables and later examine the results for the individual measures.  We treat disasters, disease 
outbreaks and health services similarly.
40  By construction, the first principal components have 
mean zero and a standard deviation of one. 
  The first column of Table 5 shows that the interactions between strictness and the 
                                                            
38 We define similar sized denominations using a size window of log 3 (matching to each denomination, other 
denominations with log US size plus or minus 1.5).  Because the window for neighboring denominations is 
truncated for the largest and smallest groups, the instrument is not defined for these denominations. 
39 Results are similar when we use bins of 100 instead of 50 in the second-stage estimation. We also experimented 
with using the polynomials of estimated propensity scores and obtained similar results.  
40 For disasters, we use the first principal component of four incidence variables:  earthquakes, landslides, volcanic 
eruptions, and windstorms; for disease outbreaks, we use the first principal component for four events:  cholera, 
dengue fever, influenza/SARS, and meningococcal outbreaks; for health services, we use the first principal 
component of three variables:  medical personnel per capita, log hospital beds, and health expenditure as a share of 
GDP; and for communications and transportation infrastructure, we use the first principal component of five 
variables:  telephone mainlines per capita, cellular subscribers per capita, log road network per square kilometer, 
percent roads paved, and log passenger cars  28 
 
incidences of natural disasters and disease outbreaks are positive and precisely estimated.  To 
understand the results, recall that the regressions include country and denomination fixed effects.  
Interpreting the within-denomination variation, the results indicate that a strict denomination will 
tend to attract more adherents in countries with a higher incidence of disasters, be they 
geological, meteorological, or biological in origin.  Equivalently, the within-country variation 
indicates that a country that has a higher incidence of disasters will tend to have its Christian 
believers more concentrated in strict denominations.  The coefficient estimates suggest that the 
impact of disasters on denomination size is large.  A one standard deviation increase in the 
incidence index is associated with an increase in the relative size of strict denominations of 22 
log points for either natural disasters (e.g., going from Austria to Nicaragua) or disease outbreaks 
(e.g. going from Italy to Nepal).  In column (1), we also see that the interaction between 
strictness and the provision of health services is negative and precisely estimated.  A strict 
denomination will tend to have more adherents in countries with worse provision of health 
services (or, equivalently, a country with worse health services will tend to have more of its 
believers in strict groups). 
  These results are consistent with Proposition 1, which says that the relative size of strict 
denominations is larger in countries in which the shadow price of secular goods and services is 
greater.  Strict denominations do better in countries in which the net demand for social services 
is stronger, where higher net demand may come from weaker government supply of social 
services (measured here in terms of health infrastructure) or stronger public demand for services 
associated with the risk of shocks to income or health.  In our model, stronger demand for or 
weaker availability of social services increases queuing and therefore the implicit price of 
obtaining services, making membership in a strict religious organization (with its superior 
capacity for producing club goods) more attractive. 
  In the second column of Table 5, the interaction between denomination decentralization 
and country provision of communication and transportation infrastructure is positive and 
precisely estimated.  Decentralized denominations attract more adherents in countries in which 
the supply of communications and transportation infrastructure is greater.  This finding is 
consistent with Proposition 2, which states that the relative size of decentralized denominations 
is larger in countries in which the marginal productivity of pastor effort is higher.  From our 
model, higher productivity of pastor effort has a larger effect on the size of decentralized 29 
 
denominations, owing to stronger pastor effort incentives created by their having control rights.  
Our finding of positive effects of infrastructure on relative denomination size is broadly 
consistent with findings in the literature on how public infrastructure affects industrial 
productivity, and provides empirical evidence that governance structure affects performance for 
international organizations.   
In column (3), we combine the strictness and decentralization interactions in a single 
regression, which leaves results unchanged.  In columns (4)-(6), we measure denomination size 
using the log number of congregations, instead of the log number of adherents.  The results are 
qualitatively the same.  Because results for adherents and congregations are similar, we limit the 
presentation of further results to regressions with log adherents as the dependent variable.   Later 
results are robust to using log congregations as the dependent variable, instead. 
  Table 6 contains results for alternative estimators.  As Table 2 shows, many 
denominations have chosen not to enter certain countries.  To address sample selection, we 
estimate two alternative models.  Columns (1) and (2) show results for a Heckman estimator, in 
which we use as instruments either denomination presence in the country in 1970 (first column) 
or lagged presence plus average presence in 1970 of denominations that attract a similar number 
of adherents in the United States (second column).  Columns (3)-(8) present results for a 
nonparametric correction for sample selection, in which we first estimate the probability of 
presence in 2005 using a linear probability, probit, or logit model and then use dummy variables 
for the predicted probability of presence in 2005 as regressors in the second stage estimation of 
log adherents in 2005.  The instruments for presence in 2005 are the same as in the Heckman 
model.  Appendix table A1 presents first stage results.  Both the Heckman and nonparametric 
results are similar to column (3) of Table 5, suggesting that self-selection into entry does not 
appear to matter much for the coefficient estimates.  To streamline the exposition going forward, 
we present results for two estimators:  OLS and a nonparametric correction for sample section 
based on a first stage probit model, which corresponds to column (7) in Table 6. 
The results in Tables 5 and 6 include controls for the interaction between strictness and 
decentralization and a long list of country characteristics, which are shown in appendix table A2.   
Among the notable results is that strictness interacts negatively with educational attainment 
(holding constant the interaction between strictness and log per capita GDP).  In particular, we 
find that stricter denominations are smaller in countries in which a larger fraction of the 30 
 
population has a tertiary education.  This finding extends Barro and McLeary’s (2006) result that 
religiosity declines as countries become richer.  It may indicate that reliance on religious groups 
for social services is weaker in societies that are more educated (and more capable of self-
insuring against income shocks) or that in more educated societies individuals are less attracted 
to stricter doctrines.  Stricter denominations also attract relatively more adherents in countries 
that are more urbanized and that have higher life expectancy. 
 
4.3 Placebo tests 
  In the regressions in Tables 5 and 6, we assume that we have included the relevant 
denomination and country characteristics that capture the logic of Propositions 1 and 2.  To 
examine whether our results may simply be artifacts of the data, and unrelated to the workings of 
our model, we conduct placebo tests by interacting country variables with theoretically irrelevant 
denomination characteristics, and by interacting denomination strictness and decentralization 
with theoretically irrelevant country characteristics. 
  In Table 7, we consider placebos for health services and transportation infrastructure.  
The public health services that we examine – medical personnel per capita, the supply of hospital 
beds, and public health expenditure as a share of GDP – are labor, capital, or spending inputs that 
are likely to help individuals weather health shocks that affect their productivity and life 
expectancy.  One concern is that these health services may be correlated with unobserved 
components of country income, in which case the negative strictness-health service interaction 
that we find may be a byproduct of richer countries having weaker preferences for strict religious 
doctrine.  As a placebo for health services, we consider the supply of dentists per capita, which is 
increasing in average income, suggesting that dental care is a normal good.
41  While greater 
availability of dental care may enhance the quality of life, it does not represent the type of health 
service that theory suggests substitutes for the club goods provided by religious groups.  In 
columns (1) and (2), we replace the strictness-health service interaction with the interaction 
between strictness and dentists per capita.  The coefficients on the interaction are small and very 
imprecisely estimated, implying there is no relation between the availability of dental services 
and the success of strict denominations.  These results help allay concerns that we may have 
misinterpreted the strictness-health service interaction in Tables 5 and 6. 
                                                            
41 The correlation between log per capita GDP and dentists per capita is 0.64. 31 
 
  A related issue applies to our estimates of the interaction between denomination 
decentralization and communication and land transportation infrastructure.  Infrastructure is 
meant to capture the productivity of pastor effort.  However, the supply of transportation 
infrastructure might be correlated with unobserved country characteristics.  For example, 
suppose decentralized governance structures were more likely to be chosen in higher income 
countries (which results in table A2 suggest is not the case, as decentralization interacts 
negatively with per capita GDP), then the positive interaction that we find between 
decentralization and infrastructure might simply be picking up a positive correlation between 
decentralization and unobserved components of country income.  To examine this possibility, we 
use air transportation services, measured either as log passenger departures or log registered air 
carrier departures, as placebos.  Air transportation is not an input in the production of pastor 
services because church members are drawn overwhelmingly from nearby regions.  Thus, 
according to our model, we should find no result for air transportation. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 
7 show results for interactions between decentralization and air transport.  Coefficients are 
negative, rather than positive, and imprecisely estimated in all cases.  These results suggest that 
the positive interaction between decentralization and infrastructure is not driven by omitted-
variable bias. To threaten our identification, the omitted country variables must be correlated 
with land transportation but uncorrelated with air transportation. 
Turning to theoretically irrelevant denomination characteristics, in Table 8 we replace 
denomination strictness with the frequency of Holy Communion.  Communion is a practice 
conducted during worship services that symbolizes Christ’s last supper prior to his crucifixion, at 
which he shared bread and wine with his disciples.   Nearly all Christian denominations include 
some form of communion in their liturgy, which centers on simulating the taking of bread and 
wine, but they vary greatly in the frequency with which they practice the ritual.  Some groups 
share communion weekly, others monthly, and still others quarterly or annually.  The Bible does 
not dictate the frequency of communion.  The frequency of its practice reflects, in part, the 
preferences of believers for pomp and circumstance in worship.  We use communion frequency 
as a placebo for strict religious doctrine, as the ritual captures ceremonial features of worship but 
is not related to the stigmatizing features of doctrine that matters in theory for the denomination 
capacity to product club goods.  We identify a denomination as practicing frequent communion 
if it does so at least monthly, which applies to 39% of the sample; results are similar when we 32 
 
define frequent communion to be either weekly or quarterly.  Monthly communion has a 
correlation of -0.22 with strictness and -0.09 with decentralization.     
The first two columns of Table 8 are based on OLS; the second two columns are based on 
a nonparametric correction for sample selection.  Relative to Table 5, we replace the interaction 
between strictness and disasters, disease, and health services with the interaction between 
communion frequency and these country variables.  All communion frequency interactions are 
small quantitatively and imprecisely estimated.  Thus, we find no significant interaction between 
country characteristics and theoretically unimportant features of religious practice. 
 
4.4 Extended regression results 
So far, we have focused on the interactions between key denomination characteristics and 
the principal components of relevant country characteristics.  Next, we examine interactions 
between the denomination variables and the individual elements of disaster incidence, disease 
outbreaks, health services, and communications and transport infrastructure. 
In Table 9, we present interactions between denomination strictness and the incidence of 
specific types of natural disasters.  Other regressors are the same as in Table 5.  For disasters, 
there is a positive and significant interaction between strictness and three of the four disaster 
measures:  earthquakes, landslides, and volcanic eruptions, which in Table 4 are the disasters 
with a relatively high annual incidence.  The impact of disaster incidence on denomination size is 
large quantitatively.  Using the results in panel (b), increasing the incidence of disasters by one 
standard deviation is associated with an increase in the relative size of strict denominations by 19 
log points for earthquakes (e.g., going from Italy to the Philippines) and 23 log points for either 
landslides (e.g., going from Austria to Colombia) or volcanic eruptions (e.g., going from 
Argentina to Papua New Guinea).       
Turning next to biological events, Table 10 presents interactions between strictness and 
the outbreak incidences of cholera, dengue fever, influenza/SARS, and meningococcal illness.  
Strictness interacts positively with all but meningococcal outbreaks, with the strongest results for 
influenza/SARS.  A one standard deviation increase in the incidence of influenza outbreaks is 
associated with an increase in the relative size of strict denominations of 17 log points.   
In Table 11 we present the interactions between strictness and health services.  There is a 
negative and significant interaction between strictness and medical personnel per capita and log 33 
 
hospital beds; for health expenditure as a share of GDP the interaction is negative but 
imprecisely estimated.  The results in panel (b) imply that increasing medical personnel by one 
standard deviation is associated with a reduction in the relative size of strict denominations by 32 
log points (e.g., going from Ghana to Poland), with a one standard deviation increase in hospital 
beds associated with a 43 log point decrease in the relative size of strict groups (e.g., going from 
Ghana to Uruguay).  Two additional results in Table 11 are for physicians per capita and 
financial development.  The interaction of the former with strictness is imprecisely estimated, 
whereas the latter is negative and precisely estimated.  The absence of a significant interaction 
between strictness and the supply of physicians may reflect the relatively small role that 
physicians, as opposed to nurses, play in  the delivery of health care in many poor countries (see 
note 34).  The negative interaction between strictness and financial development suggests that in 
countries with well-organized financial markets individuals are less reliant on assistance from 
religious organizations and more able to insure themselves against risk through private means. 
In Table 12, we consider the interaction between a denomination being decentralized and 
individual communications and transportation infrastructure variables.  Decentralization interacts 
positively with telephone mainlines per capita, cellular subscribers per capita, log passenger cars, 
and the size of a country’s road network, though coefficients are not precisely estimated in all 
cases.  Whether intended or not, improvements in communications and transportation 
infrastructure appears to result in larger market shares for less hierarchical religious groups.   
 
4.5 Discussion 
  What do our coefficient estimates imply about the relative performance of Protestant 
denominations in sample countries?  Consider the primary country characteristics that affect the 
relative size of strict versus non-strict denominations:  natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and 
delivery of health services.
42  Within sample countries, strict denominations are on average 18.2 
log points larger than non-strict denominations.  Based on coefficients from column (3) of Table 
5, cross-country differences in the incidence of natural disasters explain 11.2% of this size 
difference, cross-country differences in the provision of health services explain 8.2%, and cross-
country differences in the incidence of disease outbreaks explains less than one percent. 
                                                            
42 The effects of communication and transportation infrastructure on the relative size of decentralized denominations 
are similar, and we do not discuss them to save space; e.g., in the Guinea-Senegal example, the difference in 
infrastructure explains 13.3% of the relative size difference in decentralized denominations.  34 
 
  To further illustrate the quantitative significance of our results, we present two examples, 
one involving Guatemala and Honduras, the other Guinea and Senegal. Both pairs consist of 
neighboring countries that have similar per capita GDPs, and we examine which factors matter 
for explaining within-pair differences in the relative size of strict denominations.  The exercise 
amounts to a double differencing as we consider the average log relative size of strict 
denominations in one country minus that in another.     
First, consider Guatemala and Honduras, two Central American nations.  In Guatemala, 
the average size advantage of strict denominations is 41.7 log points, versus 23.8 in Honduras, 
for a double difference of 17.9 log points.  The two countries have relatively similar per capita 
GDPs ($4675 in Guatemala, $3028 in Honduras), identical patterns of disease outbreaks, and 
very similar delivery of health services.  Where they differ is in the incidence of natural disasters.  
Owing to its distinct geography, Guatemala has active volcanoes, whereas Honduras does not, 
resulting in Guatemala having an over eight percent higher annual frequency of either volcanic 
eruptions or of severe earthquakes.  Using coefficient estimates from column (3) of Table 5, the 
difference in the incidence of natural disasters can account for 17.7% of the relative size 
difference in strict denominations between the two countries. 
Our next example is Guinea and Senegal, two neighboring countries in East Africa that 
have similar per capita GDPs ($1012 in Guinea, $1373 in Senegal).  The average relative size 
advantage of strict denominations is 148.8 log points in Guinea and 59.4 log points in Senegal, 
for a double difference of 89.5 log points.  While the two countries have nearly identical 
incidences of natural disasters, Guinea has a higher incidence of disease outbreaks and poorer 
delivery of health services.  Again using coefficients from column (3) of Table 5, these two 
factors together can account for 11.0% of the relative size advantage of strict denominations in 
Guinea versus Senegal.  While Guatemala-Honduras and Guinea-Senegal are just two examples, 
they illustrate the manner in which natural disasters, disease outbreaks and health services affect 
the relative performance of strict denominations across countries. 
 
5.  FINAL DISCUSSION 
In the last four decades, religious groups headquartered in the United States have 
expanded rapidly across borders, much as US multinational enterprises have sought new markets 
abroad.  In both cases, globalization has been made possible by the dismantling of government 35 
 
barriers, to foreign religious groups in the former case and to foreign direct investment in the 
latter.  Much as US multinationals rely on their organizational advantages and superior 
intellectual property to compete in foreign markets (Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenan, 2009), US 
Christian denominations succeed on the basis of their governance structure and religious 
doctrine.  Along these two dimensions, denominations are remarkably heterogeneous. 
US denominations with strict doctrine, including Pentecostals, Mormons, and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, have had among the most notable successes in attracting foreign adherents.  The 
literature provides explanations for why strict religious groups have prospered in Israel (Berman, 
2000) and Indonesia (Chen, 2010) based on Iannoccone’s (1992) model of religious groups as 
clubs that produce quasi-public goods (which have mutual insurance properties) for their 
members.  Our contribution is to show theoretically and empirically how denominations compete 
for believers and how country characteristics affect the market value of a denomination’s 
attributes.  Strictness is more desirable in countries in which individuals are more exposed to 
shocks associated with natural disasters and disease outbreaks.  It is less desirable in countries 
with better health services, a more educated population, and better developed financial markets.  
One interpretation of these findings is that weak governments and weak institutions favor strict 
religious organizations.  What may in part account for the recent globalization of Protestant 
Christianity is the lowering of state barriers to religion (Barro and Hwang, 2007), coupled with 
the slow expansion of state capacity in many developing countries, leaving individuals without 
public or private means to insulate themselves against risk. 
There are sharp differences across religious organizations in terms of governance.  The 
traditional Christian church, encompassing Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglicans, is 
strongly hierarchical, with the bishopric controlling church doctrine and the hiring and placement 
of pastors and other religious personnel.  The Protestant Reformation introduced greater diversity 
in organization form into Christianity (Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison, 2006), but the advent of 
Protestantism did not mean a complete break with centralized control.  Some Protestant 
denominations maintain the hierarchical features of the traditional church, whereas as others 
endow local congregations with considerable power. 
In theory, congregation control implies stronger incentives to pastors to invest in building 
their churches.  Our finding that decentralized denominations attract more adherents in countries 
with better communication and transportation infrastructure is consistent with this reasoning, and 36 
 
provides empirical evidence for the recent theoretical developments of organization and 
international trade.  Our results also help account for the attraction of the non-traditional church 
in countries as they develop.  Development typically brings with it improvements in 
infrastructure, creating advantages for more decentralized religious groups.  The rise of 
independently run mega-churches in the United States is an example of this phenomenon 
(Brouwer, Gifford, and Rose, 1996).  The process of economic development thus appears to 
change the composition of religious organizations, leading to less strictness (to the extent that 
development brings greater insulation from risk, through either state programs or private 
markets) and more decentralization (to the extent that improved infrastructure strengthens 
managerial investment incentives). 
Finally, there is variation in doctrine and organization within non-Christian religions, for 
which our framework is relevant.  For example, the radical form of Sunni Islam practiced by al-
Qaeda and the Taliban is stricter than the main branches of Sunni Islam. Shia Islam (e.g. Iran, 
Yemen) has a hierarchy of Imams and tends to be more centrally organized than Sunni Islam 
(e.g. Egypt, Indonesia). Among the countries in which Shia and Sunni Islam are present, there is 
variation in the government provisions of public services. Our finding that weak governments 
and institutions favor strict religious groups suggests that future research could explore the link 
between weak states or weak local and regional institutions and radical Islam.   37 
 
APPENDIX 
1. Properties of the Indirect Utility Function, Equation (3) 
Iannaccone (1992) shows that ∂Vjk
m/∂ πSjk > 0 if  
1
s r Fr Rq
sq F r kk
   


 ,           ( A 1 )  
where F is the function mapping average participation to the club-good quality, Q, εij is the 
elasticity of i with respect to j and kj is the expenditure share of j (e.g. 
s r  is the elasticity of 
church participation with respect to the shadow price of the secular good, and kq is the shadow 
expenditure share of the club-good quality, Q). Condition (A1) is more likely to hold if the 
consumption of the secular good, S, is a close substitute for religious participation, R, (relative to 
its expenditure share), the marginal contribution of Q to utility is high, and/or Q is strongly 
complementary with R.  
To derive the expression for ∂
2Vjk
m/∂(πSjk)
2  we differentiate both sides of equation (11) in 
Iannaccone (1992) to get (where we drop the subscripts and superscripts and U
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quasi-convexity of the indirect utility function, but the signs of VIS, VeS, VIe and  eS Q
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.          (A2) 
Finally we use the numerical example in Iannaccone (1992) to illustrate the parameter values for 
which conditions (A1) and (A2) hold. The setting is identical to Iannaccone (1992): utility from 
the club good is 
1/ ()
dd d SK  , K = R
αQ
1-α, Q = R , α and d are constants between 0 and 1, and a 
congregant’s income is I. We use the same parameter values as Iannaccone (1992); i.e. I = 1, πR 
= 1, α = 0.3, and d = 0.8. Applying the results in Iannaccone (1992), V = 















where ρ = d/(1 – d) and δR = α
1/d. Figure X1 plots V against πS, and it shows that V is a convex 
function of πS when πS ≤ 4.2 and that V is an increasing convex function of πS when πS[2.6, 
4.2]. Figure A1 is similar to Figure 1 in Iannaccone (1992), except that the latter has log(V) and 
log(πS) on the axes. 
  
2. Proposition 1 
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, G = X, n and O = D, C, where 
the last inequality is by equation (3). The proof for  is analogous.  
 
3. Proposition 2 







   > 0 if β > 0.22 or 
h
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 > 0.77, where G = X, n. By equation 
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). By equations (3), (6) and (8), ∂V
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. Therefore, we have  

















        ( A 3 )  
To see the intuition for equation (A3), suppose αjk increases. Then under the D structure, both 
effort level and price increase, but the effect of effort level dominates, and the term e
D reflects 
the net effect of effort level on lnμ
D. Under the C structure, however, effort level increases but 









reflect the total effect of effort level on lnμ
C. Using equations (7) and (9) we can show that the 
effects on lnμ
D and lnμ
C both increase with 
h

, but the effect on lnμ







 is large the effect on lnμ








  > 0. To be rigorous, 39 
 





















































, which implies that 
h

 > 0.77 if β > 0.22. 
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   < 0 if 
h

 > 0.77 or β > 0.22. 
 
 
4. Approximation for the Indirect Utility Function, Equation (17) 
To minimize notation we drop the subscripts j, k and the superscript m below. Suppose that 





 , where S is consumption of the secular good, 
K = R
αQ
1-α, R is participation, Q is the quality of the club good, and α and d are constants 
between 0 and 1. Assume that Q equals R , average participation. A congregant’s income is I, 
and his disposal income, conditional on participation, equals I – p, where p is the monetary 
participation charge per congregant. This case is a simple variation of the numerical example in 
Iannaccone (1992), and we can plug the solutions for S, R and Q =  R  derived there (equation 
(14) in Iannaccone (1992)) into U(.) to obtain an expression for the indirect utility function: 40 
 
V = c + 
1
ln( ) ln ln I pD
d
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dd dd
SS RR
   
   ,    (A5) 
where ρ = d/(d – 1), δS = 1, δR = α
1/d, πS is the price for the secular good, and πR is the marginal 
cost for participation. Since V is linear in ln(I – p), the second order derivatives of V that involve 
ln(I – p) are 0. Therefore, the second-order Taylor approximation for V is a polynomial with the 
terms ln(I – p), πS, πR, πS
2, πR
2, and πSπR. We can further approximate the term ln(I – p) by its 
first-order Taylor approximation, d0 + β(I – p), where β =  –∂V/∂p > 0. This gives us the 
following approximation for V 
  V = M – βp, M = c0 + c1I + c3πS + c4πR + c5πS
2 + c6πR
2 + c7πSπR,      (A6) 












































































Price of Secular Good (πS)Table A1 First stage results for Heckman and nonparametric estimation 
 
Model Linear  Pr  Probit  Logit Linear  Pr Probit  Logit 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Presence  1970  0.887*** 25.60*** 76.57*** 0.878*** 25.97*** 73.84*** 
(0.005) (0.764) (1.718) (0.006) (0.866) (1.901) 
Ave. Presence 1970, Similar Denom.  -0.131***  -2.899*  -6.070* 
(0.049) (1.582) (3.115) 
Strict*Natural  disasters  0.00295 0.0882  0.153  0.00148 0.0516  0.094 
  (1st principal component)  (0.003) (0.090) (0.179) (0.003) (0.129) (0.239) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  -0.00261 -0.069  -0.182 -0.00348 -0.145  -0.313 
  (1st principal component)  (0.004) (0.104) (0.205) (0.004) (0.124) (0.240) 
Strict*Health  services  0.00107 -0.184  -0.36  0.00188 -0.205  -0.431 
  (1st principal component)  (0.006) (0.193) (0.388) (0.007) (0.244) (0.471) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure  -0.0146* -0.0866  -0.219 -0.0184** -0.232  -0.438 
  (1st principal component)  (0.008) (0.243) (0.470) (0.009) (0.296) (0.553) 
Adjusted R squared  0.812   --   --  0.82   --   -- 
Observations  9,660 9,292 9,292 9,660 9,292 9,292 
 
 
The dependent variable is the dummy variable for a denomination being present in a country in 2005. Columns 1, 3, 4 and 6 are the 
first stage estimation for columns 3, 5, 6 and 8 of Table 6, respectively. Column 2 is the first stage for columns 1 and 4 of Table 6. 
Column 5 is the first stage for columns 2 and 7 of Table 6.  
  
 
Table A2 Additional results for OLS and nonparametric estimation 
Estimation method  OLS  Nonparametric 
1st stage estimation   --  Linear Pr  Probit  Logit 
Strict*log(GDP per capita)  -0.140  -0.062  -0.050  -0.044 
(0.173)  (0.187) (0.180) (0.177) 
Strict*State Religion 1970  0.0082  0.060  0.106  0.122 
(0.182)  (0.181) (0.186) (0.184) 
Strict*(Mean % primary education)  0.0031  0.0033  0.0029  3.45E-03 
(0.010)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Strict*(Mean % secondary education)  -0.002  -0.002  -0.006  -0.006 
(0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Strict*(Mean % tertiary education)  -0.021  -0.038***  -0.043***  -0.042*** 
(0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Strict*log(Population) -0.0714  -0.116  -0.0839  -0.0801 
(0.072)  (0.076) (0.079) (0.079) 
Strict*Share of Urban Population  2.281***  2.007**  1.848*  1.816* 
(0.827)  (0.963) (0.950) (0.935) 
Strict*log(Life  Expectancy)  2.676 3.190* 3.522* 3.434* 
(2.064)  (1.863) (1.982) (1.953) 
Strict*Fertility rate  0.125  0.145 0.136 0.127 
(0.165)  (0.183) (0.179) (0.179) 
Strict*log(Distance to U.S.)  -0.419  -0.255  -0.121  -0.127 
(0.288)  (0.282) (0.284) (0.282) 
Strict*English  language  0.261  0.185 0.295 0.307 
(0.268)  (0.232) (0.261) (0.255) 
Strict*Share of Immigrant Population  -0.223  -0.957  -1.459  -2.303 
(9.404)  (7.607) (8.408) (8.167) 
Strict*Islam  dominant  religion  0.0929  0.454 0.242 0.243 
(0.387)  (0.404) (0.409) (0.407) 
Strict*Catholicism dominant religion  -0.153  0.0443  0.100  0.102 
(0.296)  (0.252) (0.287) (0.283) 
Strict*Orthodox dominant religion  0.398  0.758  1.144**  1.153** 
(0.592)  (0.550) (0.528) (0.521) 
Strict*Judaism dominant religion  0.158  0.525  0.29  0.291 
(0.391)  (0.385) (0.374) (0.375) 
Strict*Buddhism Hinduism dominant relig.  0.567  0.53  0.351  0.348 
(0.387)  (0.403) (0.405) (0.399) 
Strict*Regulation of religion index  -0.0163  -0.009  -0.028  -0.026 
(0.054)  (0.050) (0.055) (0.054) 
Strict*Rule of law index  0.311  0.412**  0.369*  0.367* 
(0.187)  (0.197) (0.188) (0.187) 
Strict*Ethnic fractionization index  -0.0583  -0.135  0.0454  0.0421 
(0.462)  (0.479) (0.508) (0.503) 43 
 
Decent*log(GDP per capita)  -0.859*** -0.630*** -0.547*** -0.546*** 
(0.209)  (0.205) (0.203) (0.198) 
Decent*State Religion 1970  0.157  0.245 0.208 0.228 
(0.178)  (0.165) (0.162) (0.161) 
Decent*(Mean % primary education)  -0.007  -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 
(0.009)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Decent*(Mean % secondary education)  -0.009  -0.012 -0.017 -0.016 
(0.011)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Decent*(Mean % tertiary education)  -0.008  -0.018 -0.025 -0.022 
(0.013)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Decent*log(Population) -0.021  -0.039 -0.049 -0.039 
(0.076)  (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) 
Decent*Share of Urban Population  2.644*** 1.841**  2.015** 2.016** 
(0.865)  (0.922) (0.939) (0.904) 
Decent*log(Life Expectancy)  2.937* 2.751*  3.054* 2.818* 
(1.734)  (1.493) (1.626) (1.653) 
Decent*Fertility rate  0.216  0.206 0.204 0.205 
(0.201)  (0.160) (0.156) (0.159) 
Decent*log(Distance to U.S.)  0.305  0.345  0.539**  0.522** 
(0.243)  (0.224) (0.221) (0.228) 
Decent*English language  -0.123  0.102  0.028  0.0433 
(0.283)  (0.254) (0.240) (0.243) 
Decent*Share of Immigrant Population  12.76  9.616 12.12 11.57 
(10.030)  (9.391) (8.038) (7.958) 
Decent*Islam dominant religion  0.335  0.285 0.243 0.254 
(0.422)  (0.394) (0.392) (0.397) 
Decent*Catholocism dominant religion  -0.359*  -0.161 -0.208 -0.219 
(0.213)  (0.218) (0.203) (0.203) 
Decent*Orthodox dominant religion  1.071 1.560**  1.838***  1.863*** 
(0.778)  (0.681) (0.634) (0.647) 
Decent*Judaism dominant religion -0.0142  0.44  0.169  0.146 
(0.377)  (0.422) (0.404) (0.410) 
Decent*Buddhism Hinduism dominant relig. 0.0982  0.00644  0.00601 -0.000702 
(0.346)  (0.406) (0.379) (0.378) 
Decent*Regulation of religion index  -0.0238 -0.0332  -0.0413 -0.0372 
(0.052)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Decent*Rule of law index  0.0966 0.147  0.0872 0.0829 
(0.173)  (0.184) (0.177) (0.175) 
Decent*Ethnic fractionization index  -0.375  -0.229 -0.414 -0.422 
(0.422)  (0.476) (0.484) (0.465) 
Instrument set   --  B  B  B 
Adjusted R squared  0.633  0.675  0.671  0.672 
Observations  1,602  1,415 1,415 1,415 
Column 1 has the additional regressors for column 3 of Table 5. Columns 2, 3 and 4 have the 
additional regressors for columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table 6, respectively.  44 
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Anglicans Britain  74.4 0.103  140
Assemblies of God  US  42.4 0.059  149
Seventh-day Adventist Church  US  16.7 0.023  216
Southern Baptist Convention  US  11.9 0.017  110
Jehovah's Witnesses  US  11.1 0.015  214
SIM Church  US  11.0 0.015  14
New Apostolic Church  Switzerland  7.4 0.010  149
Church of God (Cleveland)  US  7.0 0.010  124
Ch of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints  US  6.7 0.009  146
American Baptist Churches in the USA  US  5.7 0.008  11
SFM/NPY/FFFM Swed/Norw/Finl  4.0 0.006  37
Church of the Foursquare Gospel  US  3.7 0.005  59
United Methodist Church (USA)  US  3.7 0.005  44
Presbyterian Church (USA)  US  3.4 0.005  20
Africa Inland Church  Britain/US  3.2 0.004  7
Christian and Missionary Alliance  US  3.2 0.004  50
Methodist Church of Great Britain  Britain  2.9 0.004  18
Pentecostal Assemblies of God (Canada)  Canada  2.9 0.004  29
United Pentecostal Church  US  2.4 0.003  90
Christian Aviation Ministries  US  2.1 0.003  7
Christian Brethren (Open)  US  1.9 0.003  43
Baptist Unions/BWA  US  1.9 0.003  44
PEMS France  France  1.9 0.003  6
Pres Ch of East Africa (Ch of Scotland)  Britain  1.8 0.003  3
Evangelical Alliance Mission  US  1.6 0.002  28
Salvation Army  US  1.6 0.002  86
Apostolic Church Missionary Movement  Britain  1.5 0.002  7
OMS International  US  1.4 0.002  11
Church of the Nazarene  US  1.2 0.002  102
Evangelical Lutheran Ch in America  US  1.1 0.002  19
Church of God of Prophecy  US  1.0 0.001  81
Churches of Christ (Instrumental)  US  1.0 0.001  31
Zion Christian Church  South Africa  0.9 0.001  5
Former AUCECB  Russia  0.9 0.001  13
Moravian Church  US  0.9            0.001  31
 
This table is based on the global membership of denominations outside of the US.  49 
 
Table 2:  Presence of US denominations abroad in 1970 and 2005 
 
Denomination present in 
1970 
      0 1  Total
Denomination 0  9,891 2  9,893
present in 2005  (0.865)
1 305 1,242  1,547
            (0.135)
Total 10,196 1,244  11,440
(0.891) (0.109) 
 
This table shows the number of cases in which a US denomination (N = 130) is present in a 





Table 3:  Governance structure and religious doctrine of US denominations 
 
Variable Mean  St.  Dev. 
Denomination is decentralized (congregational polity)  0.554  0.499 
Denomination is theologically strict (row mean > .5)  0.446  0.499 
Is evangelism an essential function of all churches and believers?   0.808  0.396 
Is repentance and conversion essential for all believers?  0.754  0.432 
Is bible considered inerrant or infallible?   0.746  0.437 
Is the damnation of non-believers emphasized?  0.700  0.460 
Is imminence of 2nd coming of Christ emphasized?  0.262  0.441 
Is sanctification emphasized?  0.223  0.418 
Is speaking in tongues emphasized?  0.208  0.407 
Are drinking, smoking, cultural activities, or dress restricted?  0.246  0.450 
Is ongoing practice of divine healing emphasized?  0.292  0.457 
 




Table 4:  Summary statistics for country variables 
Variable Mean  St.  Dev. 
log GDP per capita  7.63  1.60 
log population  16.33  1.39 
mean % primary education (Barro & Lee)  33.00  13.85 
mean % secondary education (Barro & Lee)  33.12  19.07 
mean % tertiary education (Barro & Lee)  10.46  8.48 
urban population/total population  0.40  0.22 
log life expectancy  4.16  0.16 
total fertility rate  3.74  1.69 
log distance to US  8.93  0.45 
= 1 if English official language  0.18  0.39 
Immigrants in US/total population  0.01  0.01 
= 1 if Islam dominant religion  0.22  0.41 
= 1 if Catholicism dominant religion  0.40  0.49 
= 1 if Orthodox dominant religion  0.07  0.25 
= 1 if Judaism dominant religion  0.01  0.11 
= 1 if Buddhism, Hinduism dominant religion  0.07  0.25 
regulation of religion index (Grim & Finke)  2.68  2.65 
= 1 if country had state religion in 1970  0.42  0.50 
rule of law index (Freedom House)  0.00  0.98 
ethnic fractionalization index (Alesina et al.)  0.39  0.25 
annual incidence of landslides (>1000 affected)  0.02  0.04 
annual incidence of eruptions (>1000 affected)  0.03  0.09 
annual incidence of wind storms (5+ days)  0.01  0.02 
annual incidence of earthquakes (>7 Richter)  0.03  0.09 
annual incidence of military conflict  0.20  0.29 
annual incidence of cholera (>1000 affected)  0.02  0.74 
annual incidence of dengue fever (>1000 affected)  0.01  0.33 
annual incidence of flu/SARS (>1000 affected)  0.003  0.18 
annual incidence of meningococcal (>1000 affected)  0.01  0.32 
log hospital beds   0.98  0.98 
medical personnel per 1,000  3.81  3.86 
public health expenditure/GDP x 100  3.87  2.10 
dentists per 1,000  0.37  0.35 
fixed mainlines per 1,000  16.59  19.52 
cellular subscriptions per 1,000  15.70  15.87 
passenger cars per 100  13.44  16.22 
roads paved (%)  49.72  32.69 
log road network per square km  -1.30  1.44 
log annual air carrier departures  10.14  1.82 
log annual air passengers carried  14.10  2.15  
 
Table 5:  Baseline results 
 
Dependent variable 
Log adherents  Log congregations 
Regressors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.218***  0.228***  0.126**  0.132*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.215***  0.217***  0.187**  0.188** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.081) 
Strict*Health services  -0.400***  -0.367***  -0.313**  -0.282** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.143)  (0.138)  (0.135)  (0.130) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.531*** 0.531***  0.531*** 0.420*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.120)  (0.192)  (0.120)  (0.151) 
Adjusted R squared  0.615  0.606  0.633     0.593  0.606  0.612 
Observations 1,613  1,980  1,602  1,613  1,980  1,602 
 
The dependent variable is either the log number of adherents (columns 1-3) or the log number of congregations 
(columns 4-6).  Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and interactions between 
Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics (see appendix).  Standard errors clustered by country.  






Table 6:  Heckman and nonparametric estimation 
 
Estimation procedure  Heckman  Nonparametric  Nonparametric 
1st stage estimation  Probit  Probit  Linear Pr Probit  Logit  Linear Pr Probit  Logit 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.197*** 0.227*** 0.185*** 0.196***  0.191*** 0.239*** 0.216*** 0.219***
  (1st principal component)  (0.076)  (0.084) (0.050) (0.054)  (0.052) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) 
Strict*Disease  outbreaks  0.189** 0.251** 0.204** 0.158*  0.164** 0.268*** 0.227** 0.231** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.093)  (0.098) (0.083) (0.084)  (0.082) (0.092) (0.088) (0.089) 
Strict*Health services  -0.341**  -0.376** -0.336** -0.340*** -0.325** -0.353** -0.341** -0.342** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.167)  (0.177) (0.129) (0.126)  (0.124) (0.155) (0.151) (0.151) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure  0.586** 0.621** 0.450** 0.373*  0.386** 0.466** 0.382** 0.394** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.233)  (0.251) (0.185) (0.192)  (0.188) (0.190) (0.185) (0.181) 
Instrument  set  A B A A  A B B B 
Adjusted  R  squared  --  --  0.664 0.661  0.661 0.675 0.671 0.672 
Observations  11,960  9,660 1,602 1,602  1,602 1,415 1,415 1,415 
 
The dependent variable is the log number of adherents.  Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and 
interactions between Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics (see appendix).  Columns 1-2 use a Heckman 
estimator, with a probit model used to estimate the first stage probability of a denomination being present in a country; columns 3-8 
use a nonparametric estimator, with a linear probability, probit, or logit model used to estimate the first stage probability of a 
denomination being present.  The instrument set refers to the additional variables used in the first stage estimation, with set A 
including lagged denomination presence in 1970 and set B including set A plus the average of lagged presence in 1970 for 
denominations with a similar size in the US.  Standard errors are clustered by country.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 7:  Placebo tests for health services and transportation infrastructure 
 
Estimation method  OLS  Nonparam.  OLS  Nonparametric 
Regressors  (1) (2)  Regressors  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.236*** 0.214*** Strict*Natural  disasters  0.206*** 0.179** 0.179*** 0.204*** 
  (1st principal comp.)  (0.063)  (0.070)    (1st principal comp.)  (0.056)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.057) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.280*** 0.299*** Strict*Disease  outbreaks  0.226*** 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.224*** 
  (1st principal comp.)  (0.083)  (0.093)    (1st principal comp.)  (0.075)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.075) 
Strict*Dentists per capita  0.122  -0.037  Strict*Health services  -0.410***  -0.342**  -0.374**  -0.404*** 
(0.344) (0.384)   (1st principal comp.)  (0.138)  (0.161)  (0.157)  (0.140) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.659*** 0.472**  Decentralized*Log    -0.145 -0.069  -0.125 -0.171 
  (1st principal comp.)  (0.201)  (0.197)    Air transport  (0.110)  (0.123)  (0.125)  (0.106) 
Air transport measure   --   --  Passengers Carriers  Passengers Carriers 
Adjusted R squared  0.629  0.669  0.626  0.664  0.665  0.625 
Observations  1,606 1,418     1,579  1,420 1,395  1,607 
 
The dependent variable is the log number of adherents.  Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and 
interactions between Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics.  In columns 1 and 2, dentists per capita serve as a 
placebo for health services; in columns 3-6, air transport serves as a placebo for land transportation and communication infrastructure.  
Except for the boldfaced regressors above, the specifications in columns 1, 3, and 4 correspond to that in column 3 of Table 5 and the 
specifications in columns 2, 5 and 6 correspond to that in column 7 of Table 6.  Standard errors are clustered by country.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
   
 
Table 8 Placebo tests for doctrinal strictness of denominations 
 
Estimation method  OLS  Nonparametric 
1st stage estimation   --   --  Probit  Probit 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Communion*Natural 
disasters -0.044  -0.094  -0.046  -0.085 
  (1st principal component) (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.086)  (0.088) 
Communion*Disease 
outbreaks 0.006  0.008  0.029  0.043 
  (1st principal component) (0.120)  (0.114)  (0.111)  (0.109) 
Communion*Health services  -0.022  0.029  0.040  0.105 
  (1st principal component) (0.137)  (0.143)  (0.131)  (0.142) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.635***  0.423* 
  (1st principal component)  (0.206)  (0.216) 
Instrument set  B  B 
Adjusted R squared  0.612  0.633  0.656  0.674 
Observations 1,531  1,520  1,367  1,357 
 
 
The dependent variable is the log number of adherents.  Regressions include country dummies, 
denomination dummies, and interactions between Decentralized and Strict and other country 
characteristics.  The frequency of communion serves as a placebo for the strictness of religious 
doctrine. Except for the boldfaced regressors above, the specifications in columns 1 and 2 
correspond to those in column 3 of Table 5 and the specifications in columns 3 and 4 
correspond to those in column 7 of Table 6.  See notes to Table 6 on the definition of the 




Table 9:  Extended results for strictness interactions with natural disasters 
log adherents 





Strict*Disaster incidence  6.915***  2.509***  -0.317  1.782* 
(2.401) (0.517)  (4.016)  (0.921) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.228***  0.211***  0.183**  0.199*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.079)  (0.076)  (0.085)  (0.075) 
Strict*Health services  -0.361***  -0.396***  -0.375**  -0.379*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.136)  (0.137)  (0.152)  (0.142) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.536***  0.556***  0.549***  0.525*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.195)  (0.195)  (0.202)  (0.198) 
Adjusted R squared  0.633  0.633  0.631  0.632 
Observations 1,602  1,602  1,602  1,602 
(b) Nonparametric  
(Instr. Set B)             
Strict*Disaster incidence  7.200***  2.615***  -3.864  1.901** 
(2.310) (0.602)  (4.162)  (0.935) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.283***  0.261***  0.238**  0.260*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.090)  (0.093)  (0.091)  (0.087) 
Strict*Health services  -0.358**  -0.380**  -0.390**  -0.372** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.151)  (0.155)  (0.154)  (0.157) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.481**  0.498**  0.454**  0.440** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.191)  (0.194)  (0.204)  (0.194) 
Adjusted R squared  0.675  0.674  0.673  0.673 
Observations 1,415  1,415  1,415  1,415 
 
Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and interactions between 
Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics.  Except for the boldfaced regressors 
above, the specifications in panel (a) correspond to those in column 3 of Table 5 and the 
specifications in panel (b) correspond to those in column 7 of Table 6.  See notes to Table 6 on 
the instrument set.  Standard errors are clustered by country.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 56 
 
Table 10:  Extended results for strictness interactions with disease outbreaks 
 
log adherents 





Strict*Disease incidence  0.224*  0.036  0.860***  -0.096 
(0.117) (0.189) (0.299)  (0.420) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.207***  0.200***  0.204***  0.205*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.053)  (0.057)  (0.053)  (0.053) 
Strict*Health services  -0.445***  -0.410***  -0.323**  -0.413*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.144)  (0.144)  (0.143)  (0.144) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.539***  0.539***  0.525***  0.540*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.187)  (0.185)  (0.192)  (0.185) 
Adjusted R squared  0.632  0.632  0.632  0.632 
Observations 1,602  1,602  1,602  1,602 
(b) Nonparametric  
(Instr. Set B)             
Strict*Disease incidence  0.193  -0.086  1.085***  0.021 
(0.138) (0.208) (0.318)  (0.610) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.217***  0.228***  0.206***  0.225*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.060)  (0.067)  (0.060)  (0.060) 
Strict*Health services  -0.422***  -0.392**  -0.288*  -0.395** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.156)  (0.152) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.479**  0.467**  0.471**  0.450** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.190)  (0.186)  (0.185)  (0.193) 
Adjusted R squared  0.672  0.672  0.675  0.673 
Observations 1,415  1,415  1,415  1,415 
 
 
Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and interactions between 
Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics.  Except for the boldfaced regressors 
above, the specifications in panel (a) correspond to those in column 3 of Table 5 and the 
specifications in panel (b) correspond to those in column 7 of Table 6.  See notes to Table 6 on 


















Strict*Health services  -0.475***  -0.089**  -0.050  0.010  -0.737** 
(0.181) (0.039)  (0.054)  (0.151) (0.333) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.191***  0.247***  0.228*** 0.226***  0.251*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.059) (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.060) (0.056) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.192**  0.176**  0.252*** 0.237***  0.286*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.077) (0.085)  (0.077)  (0.078) (0.077) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.618*** 0.548*** 0.629*** 0.658*** 0.611*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.200) (0.180)  (0.197)  (0.195) (0.196) 
Adjusted R squared  0.627  0.633  0.626  0.626  0.625 
Observations 1,635  1,602  1,635  1,635  1,631 
(b) Nonparametric  
(Instr. Set B)                
Strict*Health services  -0.456**  -0.087**  -0.048  0.089  -1.052***
(0.197) (0.041)  (0.056)  (0.159) (0.342) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.191***  0.262***  0.224*** 0.224***  0.249*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.066) (0.059)  (0.062)  (0.067) (0.062) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.246***  0.218**  0.294*** 0.280***  0.303*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.088) (0.105)  (0.088)  (0.094) (0.089) 
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.585***  0.477** 0.601*** 0.638***  0.452** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.198) (0.185)  (0.198)  (0.194) (0.196) 
Adjusted R squared  0.671  0.675  0.670  0.670  0.667 
Observations 1,444  1,415  1,444  1,444  1,441 
 
 
Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and interactions between 
Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics.  Except for the boldfaced regressors 
above, the specifications in panel (a) correspond to those in column 3 of Table 5 and the 
specifications in panel (b) correspond to those in column 7 of Table 6.  See notes to Table 6 on 

















Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.021*  0.031**  0.026**  0.279** 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.137) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.217***  0.216***  0.232***  0.212*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.056) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.220***  0.223***  0.218***  0.221*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.076)  (0.075)  (0.077)  (0.073) 
Strict*Health services  -0.357**  -0.381***  -0.347**  -0.396*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.146)  (0.142)  (0.139)  (0.138) 
Adjusted R squared  0.625  0.625  0.633  0.625 
Observations 1,613  1,613  1,602  1,613 
(b) Nonparametric  
(Instr. Set B)             
Decentralized*Infrastructure 0.016  0.018 0.029** 0.214 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.145) 
Strict*Natural disasters  0.214*** 0.198***  0.233***  0.201*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.061)  (0.067) 
Strict*Disease outbreaks  0.292*** 0.302***  0.237***  0.268*** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.088)  (0.084) 
Strict*Health services  -0.314*  -0.340**  -0.325**  -0.329** 
  (1st principal component)  (0.167)  (0.164)  (0.155)  (0.159) 
Adjusted R squared  0.668  0.669  0.675  0.666 
Observations 1,425  1,425  1,415  1,425 
 
 
Regressions include country dummies, denomination dummies, and interactions between 
Decentralized and Strict and other country characteristics.  Except for the boldfaced regressors 
above, the specifications in panel (a) correspond to those in column 3 of Table 5 and the 
specifications in panel (b) correspond to those in column 7 of Table 6.  Standard errors are 




Figure 1:  Market share of denominations by headquarter country 
 






























Figure 3a:  Global membership and U.S. membership, 2005 
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Figure 4:  Distribution of doctrinal strictness across US denominations 
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